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Abstract
Debt with many creditors is analyzed in a continuous-time pricing model of the
levered ﬁrm in the presence of corporate taxes. We speciﬁcally allow for debtor oppor-
tunism in form of repeated strategic renegotiation oﬀers and default threats. Dispersed
creditors will only accept coupon concessions in exchange for guaranteed liquidation
rights, e.g. collateral. The ex ante optimal debt contract is secured with assets which
gradually become worthless as the ﬁrm approaches the preferred liquidation conditions,
i no r d e rt oa l l o wf o rs u ﬃcient, but delayed renegotiability. Compared with single-
creditor debt, dispersed debt oﬀers a larger debt capacity, and it is preferable ex-ante
if the value of collateralizable assets is then reduced. Our model can explain credit
risk premia in excess of those supported by a single creditor model with opportunistic
renegotiation.
JEL Nos.: G12, G32, G33.
Keywords: Debt Reorganization, Multiple Creditors, Priority of Claims, Debt Pricing.
∗HEC School of Management, CentER and CEPR. Address: HEC School of Management, Department
of Finance and Economics, 1 rue de la Liberation, F-78351 Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, France. Tel. +33 1 3967
7299, Fax +33 1 3967 7085. Email hege@hec.fr.
†London Business School and CEPR. Address: Sussex Place, Regents Park, London NW1 4AS, UK. Tel.
+44-(0)20-7262.50.50 ext. 3478. Email: pmellabarral@london.edu.
Financial support for this project from the Financial Markets Group at the LSE and the hospitality of
Tilburg University is gratefully acknowledged. We are grateful to seminar audiences at Aarhus, ESSEC,
Groningen, LSE, Queen Mary and Westﬁeld London, Mannheim, Odense, Rotterdam, Tilburg, Vienna, the
CEPR Financial Markets Conference in Louvain-la-Neuve, and the CEPR Corporate Finance Conference
in Courmayeur for helpful comments. We also wish to thank Sudipto Bhattacharya, Lara Cathart, Jon
Danielsson, Darrell Duﬃe, Jan Ericsson, Martin Hellwig, David Webb and an anonymous referee for useful
comments and advise. Any errors remain our responsibility.Recently, a growing body of literature has introduced corporate ﬁnance concepts into
valuation models of defaultable securities. Variables such as the capital structure choice,
the lower reorganization bound and the outcome of bargaining between debtor and creditors
have been endogenized in fully dynamic models.1 Yet in all the existing work incorporating
capital structure theory or bargaining models into debt valuation theory, the number of
creditors has been ignored and implicitly, a ﬁction has been invoked that the borrower is
confronted with a single “representative” creditor.
The purpose of this paper is to explicitly model the strategic interaction between share-
holders and creditors when there are multiple creditors. We study dynamic strategies of
debt renegotiation and default in this environment and analyze the impact of the optimal
opportunistic debtor strategy on the value of defaultable bonds and on ﬁnancing decisions.
There is little reason to assume that creditors would coordinate their responses to a
renegotiation oﬀer or a default threat: An individual creditor will prefer to free-ride on the
debt restructuring eﬀort of others, and the larger the number of creditors, the stronger this
tendency to hold out.2 Individual creditors are not inclined to make concessions, although
they realize that doing so would be in their collective interest. The importance of the
hold-out eﬀect is highlighted by numerous empirical studies showing that out-of-court debt
restructurings with many creditors bear a substantial risk of failure.3
This issue plays a prominent role in recent literature on the choice between private (or
concentrated) and public (or dispersed) debt, which has discussed the advantages of sticky
renegotiation. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and Bergl¨ of and von Thadden (1994) argue that
the lack of renegotiability can be an important advantage of dispersed debt, since it makes
strategic default less attractive and mitigates risk-shifting incentives. Similarly, Dewatripont
and Maskin (1995) and Bolton and Freixas (2000) argue that some ﬁrms will deliberately
disperse their debt in order to signal their commitment to good behavior. Focusing on
diﬀerences in how dispersed or concentrated debt claims are monitored, Diamond (1991),
Rajan (1992) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) argue that some ﬁrms will prefer to
borrow at arm’s length in order to signal their strength or to avoid the pitfalls of an exclusive
lending relationship.
Diﬀusely held debt is not simply immune to renegotiation eﬀorts. But if creditors are
dispersed, debt restructuring proposals must be engineered so as to spoil the attractiveness of
1Building on Black and Cox (1976), Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996) endogenize the share-
holders’ decision to trigger liquidation and determine the optimal capital structure of ﬁrm. Anderson and
Sundaresan (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Mella-Barral (1999) extend the analysis to allow
for the strategic interaction between shareholders and debtholders in debt renegotiation, prior to liquida-
tion. Ericsson (2000) and Leland (1998) provide models that account for the asset subtitution or risk shifting
eﬀect. Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001) further consider releverage opportunities.
2More precisely, an individual investors’ incentives to hold out depends on the probability of being “piv-
otal” for success or failure of the tender oﬀer, quite similar to the analogous eﬀect in takeover bids. See e.g.
Detragiache and Garella (1996) and Hege (2002) for an analysis.
1the hold-out option. Opportunistic shareholders faced with a non-cohesive group of creditors
have actually powerful devices at hand to dilute the value of creditors rejecting the oﬀer.
T h e s ed i l u t i o nd e v i c e sh a v ei nc o m m o nt h a tt h e y(i) impose a scheme of wealth transfers
from creditor to creditor,a n d(ii) make these transfers implicitly conditional on rejection of
the debt restructuring proposal. These strategies are thus not applicable if the debt issuer
faces a single creditor, and they are coercive since creditors stand to lose if they do not
accept the restructuring proposal, relative to those who do. Creditors are made to rush in
to tender, in particular if the number of new contracts is limited and they are served on a
ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-serve basis.
Empirical literature suggests that debt-for-debt exchange oﬀers proposing more liqui-
dation rights are the leading case of such dilution threats and are in fact very common.
A well-known example are the so-called “exit consents”, where the right to participate in
the exchange or tender oﬀer is explicitly tied to a vote approving the exit from a covenant
restricting the issuance of new debt (Roe (1987)). Bondholders will then ﬁr s tr u s hi nt o
waive the covenant to secure their right to exchange; once the covenant is stripped, each
bondholder prefers to tender because if he were the only one to hold out, the liquidation
value of his claim, as well as the secondary market value of a severely illiquid bond issue,
would suﬀer.
This paper examines the optimal debt renegotiation strategy of an opportunistic debtor
facing a non-coordinated group of creditors in a continuous-time model of the levered ﬁrm.
The set-up of the model is adapted from Mella-Barral (1999) to allow for multiple creditors
and the tax advantage of debt. We allow for a rich set of actions at the discretion of the debtor
and study strategies of repeated debt exchange oﬀers and dilution threats. The exchange
oﬀer strategies available to shareholders follow closely typical procedures in debt exchange
oﬀers, allowing the debtor to oﬀer more liquidation rights in exchange for concessions, as
well as the possibility to default strategically. Importantly, these opportunistic actions can
be taken at any time, and as often as the debtor likes.
The dynamic dimension turns out to be crucial: The possibility of subsequent renegotia-
tion rounds severely limits the size of concessions that can be obtained. That is, an exchange
oﬀer cannot succeed if tendering creditors are only oﬀered liquidation rights which can be
re-expropriated later on. To be successful, it must oﬀer additional liquidation rights which
are guaranteed, in the sense that they are immune to subsequent dilution.
We solve for the shareholder’s ex post optimal exchange oﬀer strategy, and show that the
shareholder will successively trade coupon concessions for increases in guaranteed liquidation
rights, until all expected liquidation proceeds are fully impaired by guaranteed liquidation
3Empirical work by Brown, James and Mooradian (1993)(1994), James (1995)(1996) Franks and Torous
(1989)(1994), Gilson, John and Lang (1990), Gilson (1997), Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994), Helwege
(1999), Chatterjee, Dhillon and Ramirez (1995) and Hotchkiss (1995) shows evidence in this respect.
2rights. Creditors’ initial entitlement to a share of the liquidation proceeds which are not
guaranteed turns out to have simply no value since it will subsequently be expropriated.
Moving backwards in time, we examine the optimal ex ante policy of the ﬁrm. The
optimal debt contract will withhold the entire value of the liquidation rights at the anticipated
abandonment point for use in contingent renegotiation. The optimal capital structure trades
oﬀ the ﬁscal advantage of debt against an increasingly ineﬃcient abandonment decision. We
derive closed-form solutions for the value of equity and defaultable bonds.
We then compare the characteristics of renegotiable dispersed debt to those of debt issues
that cannot be renegotiated, as they have been studied in Merton (1974) type models, notably
by Leland (1994). We observe that if all assets are initially guaranteed in our setting, then
dispersed debt is not renegotiable, facilitiating this comparison. We ﬁnd that the option to
r e n e g o t i a t ed e b ti sa l w a y sv a l u a b l e ,s i n c ei ta l l o w st oi s s u em o r ed e b te xa n t e .
We explore also the choice between dispersed (public) debt and debt held by a single
creditor (private debt). Debt renegotiation models with a single creditor4 show that share-
holders, when faced with a single creditor, can strategically obtain concessions by threatening
to walk away. We ﬁnd that creditor dispersion enhances the ex ante borrowing capacity of
the ﬁrm, because it credibly limits the size of concessions the opportunistic debtor can obtain
ex post. As a result, the ex-ante optimal leverage of the ﬁrm and its debt tax shield are
typically larger with dispersed debt, but single creditor debt guarantees an eﬃcient ex post
decision. The smaller the initial debt capacity of concentrated debt, the more attractive is
the issue of dispersed debt.
Finally, we undertake an implementation of our model for a standard parameter structure
with simple closed form solutions, and we perform a numerical simulation by means of an
example. This analysis conﬁrms that the optimal leverage ratio and the resulting credit
spreads are very sensitive with respect to the model speciﬁcation. It is numerically important
to correctly account for the presence of multiple creditors and/or initial collateral or other
guaranteed liquidation rights when choosing the bond valuation model.
As a result of the high optimal leverage ratio typically obtained with dispersed debt,
our model is capable of explaining substantial credit risk premia under realistic parameter
assumptions, and in excess of the risk premia obtained with a single creditor. Creditor dis-
persion may thus be one of the factors helping to explain why Merton-type debt models
typically fail to generate credit spreads of the magnitude that is observed in practice. Inter-
estingly, while the issue of dispersed debt dramatically aﬀects the optimal ﬁnancial structure
and implied credit risk, the beneﬁts in terms of overall ﬁr mv a l u ea p p e a rt ob em u c hm o r e
modest.
We present the set-up in Section I. In Section II, we deﬁne exchange oﬀer strategies and
4See Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Mella-Barral (1999).
3explain the mechanism of dilution. In Section III, we solve for the shareholder’s ex post
optimal strategy. In Section IV, we examine the consequences for the creditors’ willingness
to lend at entry. We determine the ex ante optimal debt contracts and capital structure of
the ﬁrm. In Section V, we compare with the cases of non-renegotiable and of single-creditor
debt. In Section VI, we provide closed form solutions and study a numerical example to
assess the quantitative importance of the distinction we analyzed. Section VII documents
that our model is consistent with empirical evidence on the use of dilution threats in practice.
Section VIII looks at possible extensions and Section IX concludes.
I. The Model
A. Operations and the Abandonment Decision
Consider a ﬁrm and its real assets, controlled by a person, called the manager, from date
t = 0 on. The cash generating ability of the ﬁrm’s assets is related to a single uncertain state
variable, xt, which summarizes economic fundamentals, and follows a diﬀusion process:
dxt = µ(xt)dt + σ(xt)dBt , (1)
where B is a standard Brownian motion. Once the ﬁrm is set up, the manager can do the
following:
1. She can generate a period income ﬂow, combining her human capital and protected
technology with the purchased real assets. Let Π(xt) denote the pre-tax present value
of a perpetual claim on the income ﬂow that results from such operations, assuming
no limited liability.
2. Although she could operate the ﬁrm forever, she can also abandon operations. We
denote by V ∗(xt) the liquidation value of the ﬁrm’s real assets, net of bankruptcy
costs.
We assume that an abandonment decision is irreversible.5 Furthermore, there are some
states of the world x where other parties, like competitors, have a better use for the assets
than the incumbent. In these poor states, V ∗(x) is actually greater than Π(x)a n dt h e
abandonment decision is desirable, as formalized by Assumption 1 below. We assume that
Π(x)i si n c r e a s i n gi nx; this is not necessarily the case for V ∗(x).
5Abandoning is akin to invoking the formal liquidation bankruptcy procedure (Chapter 7 of the US
Bankruptcy Code of 1978). However, the set-up allows for a wider interpretation of the abandonment
decision, without necessarily referring to the formal bankruptcy code. It allows, for example, to capture
aspects of the property rights view of the ﬁrm: abandonment means then that relation-speciﬁc investments
with a reduced value outside the ﬁrm are dismantled and parts of the cash generating ability of the ﬁrm is
lost, and irreversibility means that the restoring of the combination of human and physical capital, after a
period of abandonment, is not costless.
4B. Unlevered Value of the Firm
It is convenient to begin the analysis deriving the value of the ﬁrm if no debt was issued,
as this is simple to do and serves as a reference case in the subsequent analysis. The tax
advantage of debt is denoted by τ.6
The unlevered value of the ﬁrm, for a given closure policy, is readily obtained. If opera-
tions are abandoned the ﬁrst time the state variable xt reaches a lower level y, the after-tax
value of the ﬁrm is
U(xt | y) ≡ (1 − τ)
³
Π(xt)+[ V
∗(y) − Π(y)] P(xt ¤ y)
´
. (2)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side, (1 − τ)Π(xt), is the after-tax value of a perpetual
entitlement on the current ﬂow of income. The second term is the product of the change in
asset value intervening when the irreversible regime switch occurs, (1 − τ)[V ∗(y) − Π(y)],
and a probability-weighted discount factor for this event, P(xt ¤ y)w h i c hw en o wd e ﬁne.
We assume risk neutrality and a constant safe interest rate, ρ.7 We denote by T ≡ inf{ˆ t |
xˆ t = y } the ﬁrst time at which the state variable xt hits the level y,a n db yft(T) the density
of T conditional on information at t. Then the probability-weighted discount factor P(xt¤y)





−ρ(T−t)ft(T) dT . (3)
Clearly, the optimal closure policy consists of selecting the abandonment trigger level, y,
in order to maximize U(xt | y). The ex ante optimal abandonment trigger level, which we
denote ˜ y, must therefore satisfy the ﬁrst order condition
∂U(xt | ˜ y)
∂˜ y
=0 . (4)
The existence and uniqueness of the optimal abandonment trigger level ˜ y is then guar-
anteed by:
Assumption 1 At entry (state x0), the option value of triggering liquidation at y,
(1 − τ)[V
∗(y) − Π(y)] P(x0 ¤ y), (5)
is a strictly concave function in y, maximized at a trigger level ˜ y strictly smaller than x0.
6As Miller (1977) pointed out, taking into account diﬀerences in personal taxation, τ = 1−(1−τc)(1−
τV )/(1−τL)w h e r eτc is the corporation tax rate. τV and τL are respectively the personal tax rate on equity
and debt income. We assume that the ﬁrm obtains full tax loss oﬀset. This means that tax carryforwards
and -backwards are possible without limit and earn interest at the riskfree rate; moreover, any accrued but
unclaimed tax credits can be sold upon abandonment of the ﬁrm. This assumption avoids that the value of
tax eﬀects depends on the ﬁrm history.
7Harrison and Kreps (1979) show how to extend the results of the paper to a world without risk-neutrality,
by using an equivalent martingale measure.
5Note that ˜ y does not depend on the tax rate τ. We furthermore assume that the manager has
the best use for the assets in the good states, and that the manager’s presence is indispensable
to unlock the value Π(x). But in low states of the world it becomes eventually optimal for
the ﬁrm to abandon and sell these assets. Figure 1 illustrates this set-up.
This structural model of the ﬁrm and its uncertain environment, summarized by
{x;Π(x);µ(x);σ(x);ρ;τ;V ∗(x)}, is expressed in rather general terms. In Section VI, we will
consider a standard parametrization of the model, which will permit to derive closed-form
solutions for the securities values and the key variables.
T h es e t - u ps of a ri st h es a m ea si nM e l l a - B a r r a l( 1999), with the only diﬀerence that we
consider taxes. This similarity is deliberate since it will allow for a direct comparison of the
results, and hence for an analysis of the diﬀerences between a ﬁrm choosing to ﬁnance with
private debt and a ﬁrm issuing publicly traded debt. We will next also adapt Mella-Barral’s
model to allow for multiple creditors.
C. Debt Financing and Shareholder Opportunism
The preferential tax treatment of debt is the reason why the manager ﬁnds it optimal, at
date t = 0, to issue a certain amount of debt. We will eventually determine the optimal
capital structure of the ﬁrm, but need ﬁrst to introduce the available debt instruments. We
restrict attention to debt contracts of inﬁnite maturity. Thus, at date t = 0, the incumbent
issues bond contracts, D0, which promise a perpetual ﬂow of coupon payments, δ0,a n d
give the right to trigger liquidation of the ﬁrm if the manager defaults on her debt service
obligation. If such a default event occurs in state y, each bond carries liquidation rights
w h o s ee x p e c t e dv a l u ew ed e n o t eb yD∗
0(y). A more detailed speciﬁcation of the structure of
the debt contracts, in particular as to components and allocation of the liquidation rights,
is postponed until Section II.E, after the fundamental time-consistency conﬂicts have been
introduced.
We assume that there are N such bonds issued and that each creditor holds only one
bond. The number of creditors N is so large that each creditor will behave atomistically,
and in particular completely neglect his impact on success or failure of a debt restructuring
proposal.8 Out-of-court renegotiation is assumed costless, whereas court-supervised reorga-
nization (Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code of 1978) is assumed to be costly, hence the
manager will always renegotiate out-of-court. We furthermore consider that in liquidation,
the Absolute Priority Rule is applied and that shareholders receives nothing.
These are clearly simplifying assumptions: In practice, Chapter 11 is often used in the
US and deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule are the rule rather than the exception.
Technically, the model could be extended to make court-supervised reorganization eventually
desirable and to allow for deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule.9 These features are
8This is a standard assumption since Grossman and Hart (1980).
9For example, following Briys and de Varenne (1997).
6not central to the mechanisms developed in this paper, but incorporating them would greatly
complicate the presentation of results and intuition.
Concerning the basic conﬂict of interest between shareholders and bondholders, we as-
sume that the manager exercises residual control rights,10 i.e. the right to freely decide on
the use of the assets as long as they meet their contractual obligations. The ﬁnal control
decision appertaining to the manager is the selection of the abandonment trigger level, y.
The manager is assumed to act in the best interests of shareholders, abstracting from the
insider-outsider agency conﬂict between shareholders and management.
The manager decides in continuous time whether and when to renegotiate the debt con-
tract. She decides on a sequence of oﬀers launched to obtain concessions from the creditors.
The decisions on the renegotiation oﬀers and the ﬁnal abandonment decision are interdepen-
dent since the total amount of concessions on the debt services determines when the manager
will ﬁnd it optimal to trigger the abandonment decision.
The dispersed creditors (bondholders) act as a non-coordinated group in contract renego-
tiation, and the manager has the possibility to exploit this non-cohesiveness of creditors. She
is in a position to make opportunistic take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to the non-coordinated group
of creditors. She enforces every exchange oﬀer with a strategic default threat: If the oﬀer is
rejected, then the manager is committed to default and walk away. The creditors then react
optimally by rejecting or accepting the oﬀer without coordinating their responses.11 Notice
that such a strong shareholder bargaining position is certainly even more characteristic and
appealing in the context of dispersed creditors than in the single-creditor case considered in
Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997).
Trading of assets occurs continuously in perfect and frictionless markets with no asym-
metry of information. The manager therefore maximizes solely the value of equity and acts
in a purely opportunistic fashion vis-a-vis the bondholders. Shareholders and creditors an-
ticipate fully the impact of the manager’s renegotiation oﬀers on her choice of abandonment
trigger level, y.
10This terminology follows Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990).
11Thus, the game played at every instant is a hierarchical Stackelberg equilibria. The leader (shareholder)
commits to a particular strategy, and the follower (creditors) then react optimally, taking the leader’s strategy
as given. Technically speaking, we consider a stochastic diﬀerential game where strategies are Markov, open
loop (state dependent), and perfect state (perfect information). Basar and Olsder (1994) provide an extensive
discussion of such games.
7II. Debt Renegotiation with Multiple Creditors
A. Exchange Oﬀer Strategies and Dilution Threats
We account for shareholders’ option to make repeated opportunistic take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀers
which exploit the non-cohesiveness of creditors considering that the manager can pursue an
exchange oﬀer strategy formally deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 An exchange oﬀer strategy, s ≡ {(xk,n k,Dk) | k ∈ {1;...;K}},i sac o l -
lection of sequential debt exchange oﬀers (xk,n k,Dk): When the state variable reaches the
threshold level, xk,t h ekth oﬀer proposes the nk ﬁrst tendering creditors, to exchange their
old debt contract for a new one. The new contract, Dk, has the same contractual form than
the contract it replaces, Dk−1.
An exchange oﬀer is a proposal of a possibly limited number of new debt contracts in
exchange for voluntary surrender of old contracts, and an exchange oﬀer strategy is a series
of such exchange oﬀers. The manager will choose the exchange oﬀer strategy that maximizes
equity value. In each oﬀer, the manager, as the Stackelberg leader, commits to cease debt
service payments and have shareholders walk away if the oﬀer is rejected, leaving creditors
with no other option than to seize the court and to distribute the liquidation value V ∗(x)
according to contractual priority.
The number of exchange oﬀers, K, is endogenously determined by the game between
shareholders and creditors. Notice that the manager cannot ex ante commit to a certain
number K. We will consider that K is a ﬁnite number, but this restriction is without loss
of generality since the last oﬀer is well deﬁned, as we show. Therefore, any exchange oﬀer
strategy can be represented as a ﬁnite sequence.
Now, the size of acceptable coupon reductions is clearly limited by incentive compatibility
conditions of the creditors. One important consequence of these incentive compatibility
conditions is well-known: Gertner and Scharfstein (1991),12 among others, have shown that
pari passu oﬀers (equal seniority) will not be accepted. To see the reason, recall that every
debt value can be decomposed into two components: (i) the value of pre-abandonment
income rights (debt service payments) and (ii) the value of post-abandonment income rights
(liquidation rights). Since a non-tendering creditor can assure himself the initial coupon
without any negative consequences, he cannot be made to accept a lower coupon without
receiving a higher value of his liquidation right.
Since all liquidation proceeds will belong to the creditors anyway (by virtue of the Ab-
solute Priority Rule), the increase in the residual claim must come at the expense of other
creditors. Therefore, a successful exchange oﬀer must threaten to relocate wealth between
12See Proposition 1 in Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), p. 1200.
8creditors, or in other words it must dilute the liquidation rights of holdouts. Notice that
dilution threats can only work if there are multiple creditors who cannot coordinate their
strategies, since a redistribution of wealth between creditors can only be engineered then.
B. Engineering Dilution: Covenants and Bondholder Votes
Therefore, we need only consider exchange oﬀer strategies implying dilution, i.e. a reduc-
tion in the liquidation rights of those creditors who decline the oﬀer. We will next introduce
devices which are suﬃcient conditions to engineer this dilution, and we do so by closely
following popular procedures in debt exchange oﬀers.
In practice, covenants in the bond indentures often stand in the way of any alterations
in the priority structure; this is in particular the case for subordinated debt claims most
vulnerable to dilution threats. Typically, bond indentures require some majority or super-
majority of m ≥ 0.5 to alter any covenant. The covenant can, however, be removed using
an exit consent, also known as a consent solicitation,13 which ties the right to tender for the
new bonds to prior approval of the covenant stripping.
Moreover, popular devices in exchange oﬀers are to ration the number of newly available
contracts, i.e. to oﬀer strictly less bonds than there are eligible bonds, and to make the oﬀer
conditional on a high minimum acceptance rate. The rationing is usually interpreted as a
means to make creditors “rush in” to tender. The minimum acceptance rate should increase
pressure on the bondholders, to make sure that enough consenting votes will be cast.
Therefore, we consider exchange oﬀer strategies using the following dilution devices:
1. A covenant protects every debt contract, D0, D1, ... DK, from the issuance of secured
debt or debt of equal or higher seniority.
2. This covenant can be stripped by a majority of m =0 .5 of the bondholders.
3. The kth exchange oﬀer is made conditional on at least nk creditors tendering.
4. The number of contracts available for exchange in each round is rationed, that is,
nk ≤ nk−1 for all k ∈ {1;...;K}.14
The most recent contract carries then a protective covenant against the issuance of se-
cured or senior debt, and this covenant must ﬁr s tb er e m o v e db e f o r et h en e x to ﬀer can be
13Section 316(b) of the US Trust Indenture Act of 1939 requires that each individual bondholder agrees
to any change in a core term of a bond issue such as principal amount, interest rate, or maturity. However,
protective covenants that limit the ﬁrm’s capacity to issue senior debt can be altered through a majority or
super-majority vote.
14The assumption that the number of available new contracts is shrinking with each exchange oﬀer sim-
pliﬁes the calculations greatly: It allows to analyze the strategy choice of an individual creditor without any
strategic spillovers, i.e. the value functions of a creditor for its various options vis-a-vis an exchange oﬀer
are independent of the other creditors’ choices.
9made. Therefore, the next exchange oﬀer will necessarily be made to the creditors holding
the most recently issued contract: They are the only ones protected by a covenant, and
without their approval of the covenant stripping, no subsequent oﬀer can be made. Their
claims are guaranteed to be the exclusive target of the next oﬀer, since every exchange oﬀer
seeks only a single class of debt (Deﬁnition 1).15
The assumption that the kth exchange oﬀer is made conditional on nk creditors tendering,
is without loss of generality because in the equilibria described below, all creditors will tender.
We will make use of the accounting convention n0 = N.
C. Exchange Trigger Points, Regimes and Asset Valuation
It will not be optimal for the manager to trigger new oﬀers unless conditions worsen,
so the asset valuation problem will be path-dependent only as far as the minimum state
is concerned. Therefore, one additional state variable, ˇ xt,i ss u ﬃcient to keep track of the
path-dependence. ˇ xt denotes the historical minimum reached by the state variable xt since
the date the initial debt contracts are issued:
ˇ xt ≡ inf
0≤κ≤t
{xκ}. (6)
The time interval between the kth and the k + 1th exchange oﬀer will be referred to as
“regime” k.G i v e n t h a tt h e s e o ﬀers are respectively triggered the ﬁrst time xt reaches the
levels xk and xk+1,r e g i m ek corresponds to ˇ xt ∈ (xk+1;xk]. Immediately after entry the
ﬁrm is in regime 0, after the ﬁrst oﬀer in regime 1, and so on until the last regime K which
is maintained until abandonment.
For all ˇ xt ∈ (xk+1;xk], the value of the shares will be denoted by S(k)(xt)w h e r et h e
superscript (n) designates the regime k.T h eK+1 regimes give a suﬃciently ﬁne information
partition for our purposes, and we will use the regimes rather than ˇ xt in our notation.
After K debt exchanges are completed, the ﬁnal decision that the manager will take is the
abandonment decision, by repudiating debt contracts when xt reaches the abandonment
level, y.
We denote by Tk the set of successfully tendering debtholders in the kth exchange oﬀer,
and by Hk the set of debtholders that are being held out (or are holding out) in the kth
round for the ﬁrst time.
Notice that creditors in both sets Tk and Hk have successfully tendered in all previous
rounds: They are being oﬀered new contracts in the kth round, because the covenant re-
placement mechanism ensures that the set of creditors who tendered in the previous oﬀer,
Tk−1 = Tk∪Hk, have held without interruption the right to strip the debt from its covenant.
The value, in regime k, of the claim of each debtholder who tendered and succeeded
15We can show that our analysis remains virtually unchanged if we allowed for exchange oﬀer strategies
with simultaneous oﬀers, i.e. oﬀers that seek in every round one or several of the outstanding debt contracts.
10in obtaining the new contract in the most recent oﬀer (the kth oﬀer) will be denoted by
D
(k)
i∈Tk(xt). The value, in regime k, of the claim of each debtholder who was held out in
t h em o s tr e c e n to ﬀer (hence succeeded in all prior oﬀers) will be denoted by D
(k)
i∈Hk(xt).





After the kth oﬀer, the value of the claim of a creditor i ∈ Hj, a creditor held out (or
holding out) in the jth round, is easily determined: Once he is held out, a creditor’s expected
residual claim value remains unchanged and equal to D∗
j−1(y). If shareholders will ultimately














P(xt ¤ y)w h e r e j ∈ {1,...,k} (7)
Here, δj denotes the new coupon oﬀered to tendering debtholders in the jth round. We
can also write the value of the nk debt contracts holding the dilution preventing covenant,
when the k+1th oﬀer will be made, the ﬁrst time xt reaches xk+1: At the time of the k+1th
oﬀer, bondholders will rush in to tender their old contracts, but know that they will succeed
in getting the new one with probability nk+1/nk, and fail with probability (nk − nk+1)/nk.
















Therefore, the value of the nk debt contracts held by creditors who have always exchanged,
















P(xt ¤ xk+1) . (9)
D. The Role of Guaranteed Liquidation Rights
For the kth oﬀer to be accepted, it must be engineered so that the proposed new contract,
Dk, is more desirable than the current one, Dk−1 at the time of the oﬀer, making tendering
debtholders i ∈ Tk better oﬀ than holdouts, i ∈ Hk.
Since the problem is recursive in nature, this is less straightforward than it might appear:
This incentive-compatibility condition contains value functions which depend on possible
subsequent exchange oﬀe r s .F o rab o n d h o l d e rt ot e n d e ri ns t a t ext, it must be the case that
(i) the value from holding out is smaller than the value from tendering, and (ii) the value
from tendering must correctly discount for the bondholder’s exposure to more strategic
exchange oﬀers in the future. A feasible exchange oﬀer strategy must take this recursive
structure of the incentive-compatibility constraints into account. As we show next, this
yields considerable cutting power as to the set of feasible exchange oﬀer strategies.
Let us for a moment consider only exchange oﬀer strategies where the expected value of
bond liquidation rights does not evolve, i.e. D∗
k(x)=D∗
k−1(x)f o rs o m ek ∈ {1,...,K}.I n
11other words the only reward given to tendering creditors is (i) a non-subordinated claim (i.e.
claim of the highest priority level) on the proceeds from a liquidation sale and (ii) the right
to strip this newly created debt from its protective covenant.
Under such strategies, debtholders held out in earlier rounds are always better oﬀ than
those held out in later rounds. This is because the former will ultimately have accepted less





i∈Hl(xt) for all j>l , where j andl ∈ {1,...,k− 1} . (10)
In this context, repeated oﬀers suﬀer from a time consistency problem: Debtholders always
reject a ﬁrst exchange oﬀer, because, if the manager has later the possibility to make a
second oﬀer, then holding out in the ﬁrst oﬀer is the only way for creditors to protect
against further expropriation. The repeated nature of the problem imposes an important
credibility constraint on feasible strategies of shareholders, which will ultimately enhance the
ex-ante borrowing ability of the ﬁrm and provide a justiﬁcation for the usage of dispersed
(public) debt.
Creditors will not tender in a ﬁrst oﬀer if the total expected liquidation rights value
strategically handed out to the creditors tendering in a second oﬀer can be as high as the
expected value of liquidation rights of the bonds held by targeted creditors in the ﬁrst
oﬀer. The manager has to reﬁne her oﬀer and to give tendering bondholders more than just
seniority (which was suﬃcient in the static world of Gertner and Scharfstein (1991)): She
must be able to commit that the rewards cannot be diluted again in subsequent oﬀers.
Lemma 1 An exchange oﬀer must give tendering creditors an increased amount of liquida-
tion rights which are immune to subsequent dilution threats.
Proof: A proof is given in the Appendix.
Recall that the number of oﬀers, K, is endogenous and that the manager can always
propose yet another oﬀer. Therefore, as long as the liquidation rights are not secure, the
manager can and will launch a subsequent oﬀer which expropriates the liquidation rights
through the attribution of more senior claims.
A c c o r d i n gt oL e m m a1, the manager must provide a guarantee that the value gain in
residual claims of tendering creditors cannot be fully expropriated in subsequent renegotia-
tion rounds. Any such guarantee must set some liquidation rights aside and exclude them
from further dilution. In the following, we call guaranteed liquidation rights all devices that
oﬀer such a credible commitment. Guaranteed liquidation rights correspond notably to col-
lateral, but, if a part of the assets cannot be collateralized, also to debt in the highest class of
seniority as determined by the applicable Bankruptcy Code. This will be further discussed
in Section VII.
12E. Structure of Debt Contracts
We are now in a position to ﬁnally clarify the structure of the debt contracts. In Section
II.C, we had introduced the liquidation rights in deliberately vague terms, saying merely
that each bond would give rise to an expected liquidation value of D∗
0(x) if default occurs
in state x. Lemma 1 provides the crucial insight that this expected liquidation value must
involve guaranteed liquidation rights. Let G∗
k(x) denote the guaranteed liquidation rights
attached to the debt contract oﬀered in the kth exchange oﬀer. We redeﬁne the components
of available debt contracts, which we denote Dk ≡ {δk;G∗
k(x)} where k ∈ {0,...,K},i nt h e
following form:
1. A promise of a perpetual ﬂow of coupon payments, δk.
2. The right, if the manager repudiates the contract, to impose a prespeciﬁed sharing
of the liquidation proceeds V ∗(y) (invoking debt collection law). The details of this
sharing rule are as follows:
(a) A portion G∗
k(x) of the proceeds of the liquidation sale, V ∗(x), is guaranteed.
(b) Each debtholder is entitled to a par value, P = δk/ρ, before shareholders receive
anything. The proceeds of the liquidation sale which are not guaranteed are
distributed according to the Absolute Priority Rule.
Exchange oﬀer strategies of the kind analyzed here can be viewed as transfers from pre-
default income rights to increased liquidation rights. Our analysis therefore applies to re-
structuring package oﬀering this combination in order to overcome the hold-out eﬀect. The
repeated nature of possible dilution threats essentially implies that they can only be success-
ful if accompanied by a (credible) pledge that part of the newly extended liquidation right
is irreversible.
III. Ex Post Optimal Exchange Oﬀer Strategy
In this section we study the ex post behavior of the manager, acting in the best interests of
shareholders, that is, we examine the optimal opportunistic exchange oﬀer strategy she can
implement, once N given debt contracts of the form D0 = {δ0;G∗
0(x)} are issued.
A. The Manager’s Optimization Problem
When solving for the shareholders’ ex post optimal exchange oﬀer strategy, s, the manager
works backwards in time, evaluating the entire sequence of decisions available to her, from
the ﬁnal abandonment to the point of entry. Therefore, the manager’s ex post optimization
problem will be broken down into a recursive sequence of constrained optimization problems.
The objective function in the kth regime is the equity value S(k)(xt | y), which can be obtained
from the ﬁrm value of the levered after subtracting the value of all debt claims. The value








Subtraction of all debt claims in the kth regime yields the equity value,
S






For any given exchange oﬀer strategy, s = {(xk,n k,Dk) | k ∈ {1;...;K}}, the manager
ﬁrst calculates the optimal abandonment trigger level, ys,w h i c ho c c u r safter all exchange




(K)(xt | y). (13)
Proceeding backwards, the manager then calculates the sequence of optimal oﬀers, from
the last exchange oﬀer to the point of entry. She optimizes recursively each one of the K
oﬀers, for a given prior exchange oﬀer strategy. She does this for all k ∈ {1;...;K}, starting
at k = K and ﬁnishing at k = 1. The result of previous optimizations k ∈ {j + 1;...;K}
are fed back into the jth exchange oﬀer optimization problem.
The characteristic parameters, (xk,n k,Dk), of the shareholders’ optimal kth exchange
oﬀer, maximize the value of the equity in regime k − 1,
max
xk,nk,Dk
S(k−1)(xt | ys) , (14)






xk ≤ xk−1 . (17)
Equation (15) is called the “kth rationing constraint”, as it reﬂects the condition that the
number of new contracts will be (weakly) lower to the number of contracts previously holding
the dilution preventing covenant.
Equation (16) is called the “kth tendering constraint”, guaranteeing that tendering the
old debt contract is better than holding out. Equation (17) simply insures that kth oﬀer is
made after the k − 1th.
B. Satisfying the Tendering Condition
In the kth exchange oﬀer, as shown in Lemma 1, a commitment against further dilution
consists of increased guaranteed liquidation rights, G∗
k(x), replacing the old ones, G∗
k−1(x),




i∈{Tk∪Hj≤k}(xt) consists of the coupon right component as well as of the
liquidation value component of the debt value. This follows from our assumption of full loss oﬀset.
14for each tendering creditor. Even if held out in future renegotiations, each tendering creditor
is then assured to receive at least G∗
k(x), if abandonment occurs in state x.W e c a n n o w
also clarify how the number of exchange oﬀers, K,i sd e t e r m i n e d .T h el a s to rKth exchange





K(x). Subsequent oﬀers will be rejected, according
to Lemma 1, and are irrelevant for the equilibrium outcome.
The question is then how much new guaranteed liquidation rights must be added at every
round for the exchange oﬀer to be dynamically incentive-compatible, i.e. to be acceptable for
creditors rationally anticipating that further exchange oﬀers are possible. We ﬁnd that:












[1 − P(xk ¤ ys)]
P(xk ¤ ys)
. (18)
Proof: A proof is given in the Appendix.
Starting from the observation that an exchange must contain an irrevocable pledge of
more guaranteed liquidation rights (Lemma 1) ,L e m m a2q u a n t i ﬁes the minimum value of
this irreversible additional pledge. Each of the K consecutive oﬀers must oﬀer suﬃcient
new guaranteed liquidation rights to meet condition (18). After the kth successful oﬀer, the
remaining claims to the liquidation value that the manager can still redistribute strategically





Throughout, we restrict attention to the following equilibrium outcome in each exchange




i∈Hk(xk), is satisﬁed, all of the remain-
ing nk−1 creditors tender. This implies that all nk new contracts on oﬀer will actually be
exchanged. This is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome since the sequence of dynamic
incentive constraints ensures that the creditors’ strategies are best responses.
This outcome is typically not unique,17 but selecting this particular equilibrium can be
justiﬁed on the grounds that it is the eﬃcient equilibrium as long as debt renegotiation adds
value to the ﬁrm - and this is indeed the case as we will show (Proposition 2). Restricting
attention to the eﬃcient equilibrium is a frequently used approach for coordination games
like the present one, and game theory provides various arguments justifying this selection.18
17For example, if nk−1−1 creditors reject the oﬀer in the kth renegotiation round, then rejecting constitutes
a (subgame perfect) equilibrium response for the remaining creditor even if the incentive constraint (18) holds
strictly and the outcome is independent of the last creditor’s response.
18In particular, evolutionary game theory concepts (see e.g. Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993)) or the
Harsanyi-Selten equilibrium selection theory.
15C. Optimal Exchange Oﬀers
We can now rewrite the manager’s optimization problem (14) - (17), by replacing the kth
tendering constraint (16) with the more speciﬁc condition (18), in terms of the characteristic
variables (xk,n k,δk,G ∗
k(x)) that she uses to directly control the exchange oﬀer strategy.
To make further progress, we ﬁrst establish the following crucial Lemma:
Lemma 3 If exchange oﬀer strategy s is optimal, then the tendering constraint (18) is bind-
ing for every exchange oﬀer k ∈ {1;...;K}.
Proof: A proof is given in the Appendix.
This Lemma has a straightforward intuition (though the formal demonstration is in-
volved), since in every exchange oﬀer, reducing the new coupon on oﬀer promises share-
holders a twofold gain. First, it reduces the debt service payments value over the expected
time horizon until the ﬁrm is liquidated. Second, since the abandonment trigger level y is
monotonic in the ﬁnal aggregate coupon value, it prolongs the life expectancy of the ﬁrm,
and over the additional life span, the equity value must be positive. Thus, the manager
reduces the new coupon on oﬀer until the tendering constraint binds.
The fact that the tendering constraint is binding at every exchange turns out to be
powerful in this model: Taking the expression for D
(k)
















P(xk ¤ ys), (19)
















P(x1 ¤ ys). (20)

























P(xt ¤ ys) . (22)
Obviously, once the debt is issued, a bondholder can always decide never to tender, and
by doing so, guarantee himself a coupon ﬂow of δ0 until operations are abandoned and then
the guaranteed liquidation rights G∗
0(x) initially contracted upon. The debt value cannot
possibly be reduced below this reservation value, whatever the manager’s dilution eﬀorts.
But then note that Equation (22) expresses precisely this reservation value. Thus, we have
established that the manager is always able to deﬁne a strategy that squeezes creditors to this
reservation value. In essence, creditor’s initial entitlement to a share of the proceeds from
16a liquidation sales which cannot be qualiﬁed as guaranteed liquidation rights is worthless
since it will be expropriated through an exchange oﬀer strategy, before repudiation. Hence
we have established that D∗
k(x)=G∗
k(x), for all k ∈ {0,...,K}:T h ee xa n t ev a l u eo fn o n -
guaranteed liquidation rights is ex post fully appropriated by the opportunistic shareholder.
Solving for the managers’ ex post optimal oﬀer strategy, we ﬁnd that the manager is able to
keep the debt value to the creditor reservation value.
Replacing equation (22) into equation (12 ) ,w ec a nr e w r i t et h ee q u i t yv a l u ea s
S
(0)(xt | ys)=U(xt | ys) − (1 − τ)ND
(0)(xt) , (23)
where the abandonment trigger ys is as deﬁn e di n( 13).
IV. Ex Ante Financing and Contract Design
So far, we studied the ex post behavior of the shareholder, assuming the project to be
ﬁnanced with N given debt contracts D0 ≡ {δ0;G∗
0(x)}. Working backwards in time, we
turn to the question of optimizing the ﬁrm’s capital structure. Taking the opportunistic ex
post optimization into account, we determine which debt contract shareholder and creditors
will ﬁnd feasible and optimal at the date of entry.
A. Ex Ante Optimization Problem
At the date of entry, the optimal capital structure (the optimal N debt contracts D0 ≡
{δ0;G∗










subject to: 0 ≤ NG
∗
0(x) ≤ V
∗(x) , for all x (25)
ys =a r gm a x
y S
(0)(x0 | y). (26)
The choice of the function of initially guaranteed liquidation rights, G∗
0(x), must be
feasible. This requires that (i) G∗
0(x) ≥ 0, since creditors are protected by limited liability
and hence their guaranteed payoﬀ in case of liquidation cannot be negative; and (ii) the
guarantees cannot pledge more than the total liquidation value available, G∗
0(x) ≤ V ∗(x)/N.
Within these limits, we assume that the functional form G∗
0(x) can be freely chosen so as to
maximize the ex ante value. Without loss of generality, we assume that the manager chooses
ad i ﬀerentiable function G∗
0(x).19
The manager is constrained to choose a path that she is able to follow through ex post,
i.e. a path that is time consistent at any moment. We show in the Appendix, Result 1,t h a t
19Typically, the value of the guaranteed liquidation rights will evolve according to the value of the assets
assigned as collateral. In essence, we assume that either enough ﬂexibility exists in the choice of a subset
among the ﬁrm’s assets that is given as collateral, or that ﬁnancial engineering permits to circumvent any
restrictions imposed by the ﬁrm’s assets.
17once the manager has identiﬁed her ex ante preferred abandonment point, she will be able to
adopt a strategy that ensures she will stick to this abandonment point after every possible
future path. The initially optimal policy is thus time-consistent.
Ex ante, the manager seeks to choose the two instruments of the debt contract, δ0 and
G∗
0(xt) in such a way as to maximize the ex ante value, S(x0 | ys)+ND(0)(x0), by taking
into account that her abandonment decision ys will be a function of δ0 and of G∗
0(xt). In








After a few manipulations, condition (27) allows for the following insight.
Lemma 4 The manager will raise the initial coupon δ0 until the marginal tax beneﬁti sj u s t












Proof: A proof is given in the Appendix.
Thus, the manager’s ex ante capital structure choice is characterized by the familiar
“static trade-oﬀ” between the tax advantage of leverage and increasing expected bankruptcy
costs - here represented by early abandonment of the ﬁrm - that is a staple of corporate
ﬁnance and that is also at the heart of Leland’s (1994) model. As in Leland’s case, in
the absence of taxes (τ = 0), condition (28) implies abandonment at the ﬁrst best, ys =˜ y,
whereas for any positive tax rate τ > 0, we have ys > ˜ y. Here, the fact that debt renegotiation
is possible does not change fundamentally this ex-ante trade-oﬀ.
For a given abandonment point y, the larger the debt value ND (0)(x0), the higher will
be the shareholders’ ex ante value U(x0 | y)+τ ND (0)(x0). This is a direct consequence
of the tax advantage of debt. The policy that maximizes the initial debt value, among all
the capital structure policies leading to the same abandonment decision y,w i l lb ee xa n t e
optimal.
Therefore, we proceed by determining the minimal ex ante equity level that is compatible
with the manager pursuing ex post an optimal exchange oﬀer strategy and abandoning at a
given y. One possible alternative strategy for the manager is easily identiﬁed: the manager
has ex post always the possibility to never renegotiate. In this case, her ex post optimal
abandonment level is a function of the initial coupon δ0 alone. We will denote this optimal
abandonment level by yf(δ0), and the associated equity value by S
(0)
f (x0 | yf).
Obviously, the manager will only adopt the optimal exchange oﬀer strategy s if the
resulting equity value S(0)(x0 | ys) is at least as large than her value under this alternative
18strategy, S
(0)





f (x0 | yf) . (29)
B. Optimal Debt Contract
We will next have a closer look at the optimal balance between the two instruments of the
debt contract, the coupon δ0 and the guaranteed liquidation rights G∗
0(xt). The larger the
coupon δ0, the earlier will the manager abandon ex post; likewise, the larger is the terminal
value of guaranteed liquidation rights G∗
0(xt)), the less concessions can be obtained and hence
the earlier will be abandonment. Thus, there is a range of combinations (δ0,G ∗
0(xt)) that
will give rise to the same abandonment point y, and the two instruments are substitutes over
this range. Following the argument developed earlier, the optimal point within the range
of combinations leading to the same abandonment decision y will be the combination that
gives rise to the highest ex ante debt value D(0)(x0). Finding this optimum, however, is
not immediately obvious since the initial debt value is monotonically increasing in both the
coupon value and the value of guaranteed liquidation rights.
The optimum is in fact characterized by a corner solution. Namely, as we compare
diﬀerent combinations (δ0,G ∗
0(xt)) for a given y,w eﬁnd that the debt value is always rising
more in the coupon increase than it is falling in the corresponding reduction in G∗
0(y), needed




A proof of equation (30) is given in the Appendix. Note that this insight pins down the value
of guaranteed liquidation rights only for the abandonment point ys.I ng e n e r a l ,G∗
0(x) > 0
for all x>y s will be required, as we will discuss shortly.
We summarize our results rewriting the characteristic equations (28), (29), (30) and (26)
in terms of the inputs of the model, and restating the valuation equations (22) and (23):
Proposition 1 The ex-ante optimal debt contract, D0 ≡ {δ0;G∗
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∂
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N [1 − P(yf ¤ ys)]
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∗(ys) − Π(ys) − NG
∗
0(ys)+Nδ0/ρ] P(x0 ¤ ys)
´
=0 . (34)
These four equations determine the coupon δ0, the value and slope of the guaranteed liq-
uidation rights at abandonment, G∗
0(ys) and dG∗
0(ys)/dys,a n dys. yf corresponds to ys for
G∗
0(x)=V ∗(x)/N.
19This contract induces the manager to follow a non-cooperative optimal exchange oﬀer
strategy s such that the ﬁrst renegotiation takes place after the ﬁrst time yf is reached and
abandonment ultimately occurs at ys > ˜ y.





[1 − P(xt ¤ ys)] , (35)
S
(0)(xt | ys)=U(xt | ys) − (1 − τ)ND
(0)(xt). (36)
Proof: A proof is given in the Appendix.
Note that once we add a standard parameter structure for the values Π(xt), V ∗(xt)a n d
the underlying process xt (see Section VI.), the characterization of the optimal debt contract
in Proposition 1 will yield closed form expressions for the value of assets.
In economic terms, the conditions (31) - (33) reﬂect the following considerations deter-
mining the optimal choice of the instruments (δ0,G ∗
0(x)). On the one hand, the option to
renegotiate when the ﬁrm approaches the lower reorganization bound (low xt) allows to in-
crease the debt tax shield and hence the ﬁrm value. On the other hand, creditors must be
given protection from the premature exercise of the imbedded debt renegotiation options, and
this is achieved through a judicious choice of the slope of G∗
0(x). The slope of G∗
0(x)m u s t
be suﬃciently steep so as to reward the manager for being patient in proposing exchange
oﬀers. That is, the longer she waits, and the lower is therefore y, the more valuable must
be her eﬀective bargaining chip, V ∗(y) − NG ∗
0(y). We have already seen that G∗
0(ys)=0 .
Hence, since V ∗(x) ≥ NG ∗
0(x) for all x, the lower the ﬁnal abandonment point y,t h el a r g e r
must be NG∗(x) initially, i.e. at the earliest possible abandonment point.
As a consequence, renegotiable debt with multiple creditors imposes conditions on the
design of the function of guaranteed liquidation rights, G∗
0(x), that can be illustrated as
follows. Consider the extreme case where the initial contract does never contain any guar-
anteed liquidation rights, i.e. the initial debt contract D0 ≡ {δ0;G∗
0(x)} involves G∗
0(x)=0
for all x.I fG∗
0(x) = 0 for all x, the shareholder’s optimal strategy would be to make a single
exchange oﬀer leading to full guaranteeing of the debt’s liquidation rights immediately at
the date of entry, x0, irrespective of the coupon δ0. The same holds if the shareholder were
to issue guaranteed liquidation rights with a value evolution proportional to the liquidation
value of the ﬁrm’s assets, NG ∗
0(x)=αV ∗(x) for some constant α.
In either case, the option value of contingent renegotiation. Intuitively, this value arises
from the possibility to maintain a high coupon value as long as the ﬁrm is able to aﬀord it,
and to deploy the renegotiation option in a contingent manner when the ﬁrm falls on hard
times.
20V. The Value of Renegotiable Debt and of Debt Dispersion
Having characterized the optimal debt contract, we turn to a closer investigation of the
two important characteristics of the type of debt considered in this paper: the fact that debt
is raised from many creditors, and that it is renegotiable. We compare the debt contract
characterized in Proposition 1 with non-renegotiable debt on the one hand and debt held by
a single creditor on the other hand.
A. Non-Renegotiable Debt
Consider the case where the debt’s liquidation right is fully guaranteed, i.e. the initial
debt contract D0 = {δ0;G∗
0(x)} involves G∗
0(x)=V ∗(x)/N for all x. This extreme case
allows us to derive the following important insight follows directly from Lemma 1:
Corollary 1 Debt with fully guaranteed liquidation rights cannot be renegotiated.
Corollary 1 sheds light on a prominent special case in the structural pricing literature, the
valuation of non-renegotiable debt claims, as they are assumed in Merton (1974), Leland
(1994) and Leland and Toft (1996) in particular. In other words, our model can explain
the two joint conditions which make the assumption of non-renegotiability realistic: (i) debt
claims are widely dispersed and (ii) shareholders have no latitude to make dilution threats.
The latter is true when all liquidation rights are guaranteed.
For this special case, since there will be no renegotiation, the optimal abandonment point
can be directly determined from the initial debt contract D0 =( δ0;G∗
0(x)). We will denote
by yf the shareholders’ optimal abandonment trigger level in this case, i.e. yf is ys for the
special case of fully guaranteed debt.20 We can then immediately derive the values of each
bond and the equity, which for clarity we will denote D
(0)
















P(xt ¤ yf) , (37)
S
(0)














Obviously, the abandonment point yf is identical to the abandonment point if the man-
ager voluntarily does not renegotiate, an option we had already discussed in Section IV. (cf.
Proposition 1). It is a function of the initial coupon only, yf(δ0), since the level of initial guar-
antees is by deﬁnition ﬁxed at its maximum. Now an increase in the coupon obligation precip-
itates shareholder’s abandonment, hence increases yf. That is, since −N[1−P(xt¤y)]δ0/ρ is
negative and strictly increasing in y, for all y<x t,A s s u m p t i o n1 implies ∂ yf (δ0)/∂δ 0 > 0 .
20We already introduced the notation ys etc. for the isomorphic case where the manager voluntarily does
not renegotiate.
21To summarize, for debt contracts where NG ∗
0(x)=V ∗(x), for all x ≤ x0, i.e., for fully
collateralized debt, we know that debt will never be renegotiated (Corollary 1), and the ﬁnal
abandonment point will be at yf.
B. The Role of Debt Renegotiability
We can establish the following key insight on the value of having renegotiable debt:
Proposition 2 It is always possible to achieve a larger ex ante company value by issuing
renegotiable debt compared with the optimal issue of fully collateralized debt.
Proof: A proof is given in the Appendix.
Thus, the capacity to renegotiate debt ex post is valuable, because it allows to exploit
the tax advantage of debt without incurring large losses from premature liquidation. The
renegotiation option adds value on both sides of the capital structure trade-oﬀ: First, creditor
concessions imply that the abandonment point ys will be closer to the eﬃcient point, ˜ y.
Second, it allows to raise more debt initially, which is especially valuable during good times.
It is actually possible to show that (i) the ex ante optimal debt value and (ii) the initial
coupon level are actually both always larger with renegotiable debt compared with non-
renegotiable debt.
C. Single Creditor Debt
Our next question is whether the manager should borrow from a single creditor, who eﬃ-
ciently internalizes the value created in every renegotiation round, or whether she should
borrow from dispersed creditor whose non-cohesiveness can be exploited. To better under-
stand the relationship between creditor dispersion and debt capacity, we have to compare to
the case where there is just a single creditor, i.e. N = 1. We consider, as we have considered
so far, that the manager is in a position to make opportunistic oﬀers to the creditor.
This case has been studied in Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral and
Perraudin (1997), and Mella-Barral (1999).21 When there is a single creditor (holding all N
bonds), and the manager is in a position to make strategic default threats (take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀers after defaulting) to the creditor, the debt is ﬁrst renegotiated at a certain threshold
level, xs. In our setting, which incorporates taxes in Mella-Barral (1999), the values of each












P(xt ¤ xs)( 3 9 )
21In Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), concessions consist of
temporary debt service holidays. The shareholder, as the Stackelberg leader, makes take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers
to her creditor, strategically paying less than the originally contracted coupon. In Mella-Barral (1999), the
shareholder asks for permanent reductions of debt obligations, forcing her creditor repeatedly to forgive part
of her debt. In all models, the (blackmailed) creditor will have to accept any concession giving him a new
debt value of exactly V ∗(x), his outside option.
22Ss(xt) ≡ U(xt | ˜ y) − (1 − τ) ND s(xt) , (40)
where xs solves ∂ Ds(xs)/∂xs = 0 and shareholders’ ex post optimal abandonment point
y =a r g m a x ( 1 − τ)
n³
Π(xt)+[ V
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Creditor dispersion has a drastic eﬀect on the debt capacity of the ﬁrm. This is the
absolute limit to the amount creditors are willing to lend, or the highest feasible aggregate
value of bonds issued at the entry point x0.D e n o t eb yΛ(x0)a n dΛs(x0) the debt capacity
of the ﬁrm (a) with dispersed creditors and (b) with a single creditor, respectively







, and Λs(x0) ≡ N max
δ0)
{ Ds(x0) } . (42)
Now, because of the presence of the strategic default threat, the absolute limit to the
amount a single creditor is willing to lend at entry, Λs(x0)=N maxD
(0)
s (x0), is exactly equal
to the liquidation value of the ﬁrm, Λs(x0)=V ∗(x0).22 We then obtain:
Lemma 5 The debt capacity with dispersed creditors, Λ(x0), is always strictly larger than
the debt capacity with a single creditor, Λs(x0).
Proof: A proof is given in the Appendix.
The reason for the larger debt capacity23 is that with dispersed creditors, the strategic
default threat does not work: recall that any individual creditor is so small that her accep-
tance/rejection decision is not decisive for the outcome. Hence, if all other creditors were to
accept the oﬀer reducing their aggregate value to V ∗(x), the best strategy for an individual
creditor would be to hold out. With dispersed debtholders, strategic default threats do not
improve the bargaining position of the manager, and her only way to get concessions is to
pledge additional guaranteed liquidation rights as described earlier.
Based on this insight, we will next explore the implications of our model for the choice
between concentrated and dispersed debt. There are in fact two diﬀerences between single-
creditor debt and dispersed debt that constitute the determinants of this choice. First, when
facing a single creditor, the debt capacity is limited by the expectation that the manager can
default strategically, whereas dispersed debt amounts to a credible commitment that strategic
default threats cannot be used. Second, with a single creditor, the ultimate abandonment
decision will always be at the ex post eﬃcient point ˜ y, whereas with dispersed creditors,
abandonment will be premature (Lemma 4).
22See Equation (44), Section 6.1., of Mella-Barral (1999).
23Bergl¨ of, Roland and von Thadden (2000) come to similar conclusions about debt capacity and creditor
dispersion in an incomplete contracts model.
23With a single creditor, any feasible increase in the debt level does not lead to a higher
liquidation loss, since abandonment will remain ﬁxed at the eﬃcient point ˜ y. Therefore,
the unique optimal capital structure is to push the initial debt level up to the maximum
feasible level, ND
(0)
s (x0)=V ∗(x0). By issuing widely dispersed debt, the manager is able to
borrow more than by borrowing from just one lender, but she faces the prospect of ineﬃcient
abandonment. Thus, the trade-oﬀ between the larger debt capacity of dispersed debt and
the lower expected liquidation loss with a single creditor determines which of the two is
preferable:
Proposition 3 It is optimal to issue dispersed debt for low initial liquidation values V ∗(x0),
and single-creditor debt for high values of V ∗(x0).
Proof: A proof is given in the Appendix.
VI. Implementing the Model
In this Section, we add conditions under which closed-from solutions can be obtained for
all the concepts and results of the paper. The closed-form solution allows for a quantitative
appraisal of the eﬀects presented here, and to examine the importance of creditor dispersion
and guaranteed liquidation rights dimensions for the valuation of debt claims.
A. Closed-Form Solutions
To obtain closed-form solutions, additional structural assumptions are required in order to (i)
express the Laplace transform, P(xt¤y), in simple fashion and to (ii) solve explicitly for the
diﬀerent optimal decision trigger levels, using the relevant ﬁrst order optimality conditions.
We propose a structure, namely Geometric Brownian Motion plus linear income processes,
which is reasonably general24 and simple. There also exist alternative model speciﬁcations
allowing to implement closed-form solutions.
Assumption 2 (GBM-Linear Structure) : (i) The uncertain state variable, xt, describ-
ing the current status of the ﬁrm follows a geometric Brownian motion,
dxt = µx t dt + σxt dBt , (43)
where µ<ρ and σ are constants, and Bt is a standard Brownian motion.
(ii) The value of the ﬁrm’s operations income ﬂow, Π(xt), and the liquidation value of the
24This structure actually encompasses that of many existing corporate debt valuation models, including
Merton (1974), Black and Cox (1976), Brennan and Schwartz (1984), Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989),
Mello and Parsons (1992), Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993), Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995), Leland
(1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Fries, Miller and Perraudin (1997) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997).
They either take the total value of the ﬁrm’s assets or the price of the commodity produced as the driving
process, and all assume xt to follow a geometric Brownian motion.
24ﬁrm, V ∗(xt), are linear functions of the uncertain state variable,





1 xt , (44)
where the constants Θ0, Θ1, Θ∗
0,a n dΘ∗
1,a r es u c ht h a tΘ0 < Θ∗
0 and Θ1 > Θ∗
1.25
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Secondly, all asset pricing formulas have a simple functional form
A(xt)=aA + bAxt + cA x
λ
t , where (aA,b A,c A) ∈ R
3 , (46)




f (xt);Ss(xt);Ds(xt);V (xt | y)}. Solving for
the decision trigger levels also yields simple expressions.
Table 1 contains the explicit expressions of the constants (aA,b A,c A) for all asset A(xt),
as well as the abandonment points of (a) the unlevered ﬁrm, ˜ y, (b) the levered ﬁrm with
non-renegotiable debt, yf, (c) the ﬁrst renegotiation point for a levered ﬁrm with diﬀusely
held debt, yf(δ0), and (d) the ﬁrst renegotiation point with single-creditor debt, xs.
Finally, the characteristics of the ex-ante optimal contract with dispersed creditors given
by equations (32), (31), (33) and (31) become respectively
δ0 =
ρ
N [1 − (yf/ys)
λ ]
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i
. (50)
B. Model Speciﬁcation and its Impact on Capital Structure and Debt Pricing
The practitioner’s question will be: does the model speciﬁcation matter? We will therefore
examine the impact of (i) creditor dispersion and (ii) the guaranteeing of the debt’s liquida-
tion rights on the optimal capital structure of the ﬁrm and on the security prices. We will
then proceed to evaluate the potential error due to a misspeciﬁcation of the debt type, to see
whether the prediction errors for the capital structure and credit spreads are economically
relevant.
25Notice that Assumption 1 is satisﬁed under these conditions.
25To investigate the importance of a correct speciﬁcation of the debt model, we implement
the comparison introduced in Section V., between our model and (i) the non-renegotiable
debt model (debt with fully guaranteed liquidation rights), tantamount to an adaptation of
the Leland (1994) model and (ii) the single-creditor debt model, tantamount to the Mella-
Barral (1999) model.
For each type of debt, we determine the ex-ante optimal debt contract issued at a common
entry point, x0. This immediately gives us the optimal capital structure of the ﬁrm and its
total value. We then calculate the resulting diﬀerences in credit spreads and associated risk
premium under these respectively optimal capital structures.
We present a simple numerical application of the closed-form pricing formulas derived
under the“GBM-Linear” structure in order to gain a quantitative appraisal of the impact of
the debt model speciﬁcation.
Input Parameters: The entry state is x0 = 30. T h ei n c o m eu n c e r t a i n t yp r o c e s s ,xt,
ﬂuctuates with µ =3 %and σ =3 0 % . The value of the ﬁrm’s operations income ﬂow,
Π(xt)=Θ0 + Θ1xt, is such that Θ0 = −4 and Θ1 = 1. The liquidation value of the ﬁrm,
V ∗(xt)=Θ∗ + Θ∗
1xt, is such that Θ∗
0 =4and Θ∗
1 =0 .1. The interest rate is ρ =6% .The
eﬀective tax advantage of debt is τ = 13%. 26
These input parameters correspond to a ﬁrm with a substantial operating rent at the
entry point, x0 = 30. The value of assets is largely ﬁrm speciﬁc (the slope Θ1 = 1 is much
larger than Θ∗
1 =0 .1), but outsiders’ ability to generate cash with the ﬁrm’s assets, which
determines its liquidation value, is much superior in low states (the intercept Θ∗
0 =4i sm u c h
larger than Θ0 = −4), hence abandonment is eventually optimal (Assumption 1).
For each type of debt, Table 2 exhibits the ex-ante optimal (a) debt contract (b) capital
structure at entry. It then gives the resulting (c) ﬁrm value, (d) credit spreads, (e) risk
premium, as well as (f) ﬁrst renegotiation trigger levels and (g) liquidation trigger levels.
Diﬀerences in (a) optimal debt contract and (b) optimal capital structure are very sub-
stantial. Single creditor debt with opportunistic shareholder behavior being the most threat-
ening type of debt for creditors, the optimal leverage is in that case 29 %. This is 63% lower
than the optimal leverage with dispersed creditors + optimal guaranteeing which is 80%.
Dispersed creditors are vulnerable to dilution threats, but are largely protected from strate-
gic default threats. As a precommitment device against excessive shareholder opportunistic
behavior, issuing publicly traded debt enhances the borrowing ability of the ﬁrm and because
creditors are more willing to lend, yields a much higher ex-ante optimal level of borrowing.
Diﬀerences in (c) ﬁrm value are surprisingly small by comparison. In spite of the consid-
erable increase in leverage, the optimal type of debt (here dispersed creditors plus optimal
26This is the mean eﬀective tax advantage of debt τ = 1 − (1 − τc)(1 − τV )/(1 − τL) found by Graham
(1996) for the period 1981-1992.
26guaranteeing) only yields a 3 % improvement in total ﬁrm value. The timing of events is
nevertheless very diﬀerent. With dispersed creditors plus optimal guaranteeing (f) the ﬁrst
renegotiation takes places much later than with a single creditor, but (g) the ineﬃciency of
early liquidation is much more severe than in any other case because of the higher leverage.
Importantly, compared with non-renegotiable debt, (d) credit spreads and (e) risk premia
are 2 1/2 to 3 times larger, and this is true both for dispersed creditors and for single-creditor
debt, considering optimal contracts in each case. The main criticism of Merton-type debt
valuation models (including the Leland model), which consider non-renegotiable debt, is that
they fail to generate the level of credit spreads observed in the market. Here, once the capital
structure ex-ante optimization is taken into account, our dispersed creditor model generates
a credit spread of 298 bps. This is much larger than the 104 bps credit spread obtained with
non-renegotiable debt. What is even more signiﬁcant, it is also larger than the 257 bps credit
spread obtained with single-creditor debt. The latter diﬀerence is explained predominantly
by the higher leverage, but also the higher default risk due to early abandonment. Thus, the
correct speciﬁcation of renegotiable dispersed debt may contribute to an explanation of the
credit spread puzzle.
Clearly, these numbers depend on the input parameters for the ﬁrm, {x;Θ0;Θ1;Θ∗
0;Θ∗
1},
and the economic environment, {µ;σ;ρ;τ}. We do not extend our numerical simulations,
since our intention is merely to illustrate a qualitative insight. Unrecorded simulations with
diﬀerent input parameters have, however, consistently yielded the same message: Optimal
capital structure, default risk premia and credit spreads are substantially diﬀerent of the
pricing model speciﬁcation correctly accounts for the multiplicity of creditors and/or initial
guaranteed liquidation rights. In other words, if the pricing model wrongly speciﬁes the
type of debt, the estimated optimal capital structure could be half, and the estimated credit
spread could be a third of the correct one.
VII. Prioritization and Dilution Threats in Practice
This Section discusses the the consistency of our results with empirical evidence about ex-
change oﬀers and priority of claims.
A. Priority of Claims and its Role in Debt Exchanges
The most important form of a guaranteed liquidation right in practice, akin to G∗
n(x)i no u r
model, is certainly collateral. A lien gives the creditor exclusive access to the sales proceeds
of the collateralized asset, and hence guaranteed priority. The use of secured credit is wide-
spread: In a comprehensive study, Barclay and Smith (1995) report that on average 36 % of
all debt claims of listed ﬁrms in the period 1981-95 were secured, making secured debt the
most important category of debt even for large, stock market-listed ﬁrms.
But senior debt often also has the status of guaranteed liquidation rights, since typically
not all of the liquidation value of a ﬁrm can be pledged as collateral. Growth opportunities
27and other intangible assets will lead to sales proceeds in liquidation, but the ownership of
these assets cannot be separated from the rest of the ﬁrm, and hence no lien on them can
be enforced. Under Chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code of 1978, the estate value of
the non-collateralized assets will be distributed pro rata among all claims which have been
allowed. While all claims enjoy in principle equality, §510 of the Bankruptcy Code recognizes
explicitly contractual agreements between creditors giving priority to senior creditors at the
expense of junior claimants.
Empirical investigations conﬁrm that secured claims and seniority agreements are largely
enforced in practice. Weiss (1990) reports in an analysis of 37 bankruptcy cases that priority
is almost always maintained with respect to secured creditors. Altman and Kishore (1996)
calculate that across all reported corporate bond defaults in the period 1978-95, the mean
recovery rate on secured debt is nearly double that of subordinated debt, and that of senior
unsecured debt is more than 50 % higher than that on subordinated debt.27 In a sample
of Chapter 11-reorganizations, Franks and Torous (1989) ﬁnd substantial deviations from
absolute priority, beneﬁting both equity and junior debt classes, but they also note that (p.
755) their “results suggest that unsecured creditors receive only a small fraction of what
secured creditors obtain”. Franks and Torous (1994) show that in Chapter 11-proceedings,
junior claimants recover on average only 28,9 % of their face value, while senior creditors
recover 47 % and secured creditors, 80,1 %.28
Our model predicts29 that when renegotiating dispersed debt claims, ﬁrms will try to
increase the level of guaranteed priority rights and of collateral. The empirical literature
shows indeed that higher priority is routinely attributed in a majority or large proportion
of cases.30 As Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) note, these samples may understate the true
extent of prioritization because higher priority, whether explicit or implicit in the covenants,
may often not be discernible from the publicized terms of the exchange oﬀer.
In line with our model, James (1996) reports that the larger the number of contracts,
the larger the amount of senior debt oﬀered. Equally consistent with the predictions, James
27Since their calculations do not control for the actual debt structure of defaulting ﬁrms, one would expect
that these numbers underestimate the diﬀerence in recovery rates within as i n g l eﬁrm that has both secured
(or senior) and junior claims outstanding.
28When interpreting Chapter 11 data, one should note that 2/3 of securityholders in each class of claims
must accept the reorganization plan, making deviations from absolute priority more likely than in liquidation.
Also, Chapter 11 ﬁlings cannot automatically be equated to an abandonment decision y in the terminology of
our model. Successful Chapter 11-reorganization leaves the ﬁrm as a going-concern and attributes a positive
value to shareholders, and in many cases its economic signiﬁcance is rather closer to a debt exchange oﬀer
round in our model. This is notably true for prepackaged bankruptcies. Peterson (1993) reports that 12%
of exchange and tender oﬀers in the 1990-92 period were ﬁled as prepackaged bankruptcies.
29Other papers including Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) also predict this.
30The following fractions where more senior debt is oﬀered are reported: James (1996) 64 %, Chatter-
jee, Dhillon and Ramirez (1995) 76 %, Brown, James and Mooradian (1993) 43 %, Asquith, Gertner and
Scharfstein (1994) 41 %.
28(1996) and Gilson (1997) ﬁnd that the amount of concessions decreases in the number of
debt contract outstanding.
B. Collateralization in Debt Restructurings
There is also evidence that the level of collateral is raised as a consequence of debt restruc-
turing eﬀorts. Brady bonds are a prominent example in this respect. Arguably, holdout
problems are even more severe in sovereign debt restructurings than in corporate workouts.31
After several attempts to reschedule sovereign debt in the late 80s had failed, the solution
that ﬁnally succeeded involved a substantial collateral portion. Under the Brady plan of
1989, the par value and a rolling window of three coupon payments are guaranteed by col-
lateral deposited at the Federal Reserve of New York.
In the corporate area, there is evidence that creditors demand more secured debt as ﬁrms
approach the ﬁnancial distress bound. For ﬁrms outside distress, levels of secured debt are
signiﬁcant, but far from exhausting all collateralizable assets. Houston and James (1996)
ﬁnd that virtually all publicly listed US-ﬁrms relied on bank credit to some extent, but only
a third had secured bank debt. By contrast, James (1995, 1996) points out that virtually
all bank debt of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁr m si ss e c u r e d .
Our model predicts that highly collateralized ﬁrms with dispersed debt will have little
success in renegotiating the claims out-of-court. Consistent with this, Asquith, Gertner and
Scharfstein (1994) ﬁnd that the chances of a distressed junk bond issuer to avoid bankruptcy
via debt renegotiation decreases signiﬁcantly in the fraction of debt which is secured. Their
regressions indicate that “a shift from none of the debt being secured to all of it being secured
increases the estimated probability of bankruptcy by 0.34”.
Moreover, we predict that debtors would use all instruments to dilute the liquidation
rights of creditors, before they would ﬁnally abandon operations. Note that our model does
not predict that only secured creditors will recover value in liquidation; rather, it predicts
that the fraction of liquidation proceeds recouped by non-secured creditors increases in the
value of non-collateralizable assets.32 Consistent with this view, Barclay and Smith (1995)
ﬁnd that across all listed US-ﬁrms the fraction of secured debt signiﬁcantly decreases in the
market-to-book ratio, the proxy for growth opportunities non-collateralizable assets.
C. Other Dilution Devices
While we focus on debt-for-debt exchanges in this paper, we wish to emphasize that other ve-
hicles are frequently deployed, generating much the same economic coercion eﬀect as priority,
and which therefore should be regarded as equivalent dilution threats.
Many debt-for-debt exchange oﬀers shorten the maturity of the debt claims, thereby
31In sovereign workouts, among other things, large debtholders facilitating renegotiation are usually absent.
32In our model, non-secured creditors should receive normally a positive payoﬀ in liquidation, in all but
those cases where all liquidation proceeds could be fully collateralized.
29increasing the expected value of a tendering creditor’s residual claim at the expense of
holdouts. Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) report that 75 % of debt-for-debt exchange oﬀers
in their sample propose maturity shortening. The extreme form of maturity shortening is
a cash payment.T e n d e r o ﬀers, where only cash is oﬀered, are very common: Chatterjee,
Dhillon and Ramirez (1995) and Peterson (1993) report as many tender oﬀers as exchange
oﬀers in their samples of distressed workouts; and in Kahan and Tuckman (1993), the number
of tender oﬀers is three times higher than that of exchange oﬀe r s . A n de v e nw h e nn e w
securities are oﬀered, the exchange oﬀers often propose packages containing new claims as
well as a cash component. Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) report that cash was oﬀered in
23 % of all exchange oﬀers. Empirical studies show that consent solicitations are even more
popular in tender oﬀers than in exchange oﬀers (Peterson (1993) and Chatterjee, Dhillon
and Ramirez (1995)).
A very common dilution threat consists of asset sales occurring in parallel to the debt
restructuring. The cash proceeds of asset sales can be used to ﬁnance a cash tender oﬀer, thus
diminishing the value of existing liquidation rights twofold, via the drain on cash reserves and
the reduction in the expected liquidation value as assets have been sold oﬀ. Gilson (1997)
ﬁnds that 51 %o fﬁrms sold assets during a year in which they renegotiated their debt,
and including the preceding year, 69 % had asset sales. Crucially, he ﬁnds that these asset
sales signiﬁcantly increase the chances of a ﬁrm to get concessions on the debt outstanding.
Creating a similar dilution eﬀect, valuable assets are sometimes spun oﬀ into a diﬀerent legal
entity beyond the reach of existing debtholders.33
VIII. Possible Extensions
A. Releveraging
In our model, the optimal debt level can be shown to be a monotonically increasing function
of x0.I fxt falls, capturing a deterioration in the conditions of the ﬁrm, the debt level will
be adjusted via repeated renegotiation rounds, as discussed in Section III. In the model with
dispersed creditors, it is easy to see why a debt buyback is not attractive for the manager:
debt would have to be bought back at the full value that a hold-out strategy could secure, i.e.
the coupon level until the equilibrium stopping point ys. The total payout to debtholders
would then be the same in our model as if the debt was fully serviced until ys.A s a
consequence, debt buybacks will never be used, even if possible, because they would only
delay the stopping decision beyond the point that is optimal after entry.
By contrast, if xt rises beyond the entry level x0, the manager wishes to issue additional
debt. The ﬁrm will want to relever as its earnings reach new historic highs xt to beneﬁt form
a larger tax shield, as in Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001).34. In other words, new growth
33See Amihud, Garbade and Kahan (1999) for an example.
34We are grateful to the referee for raising the issue of subsequent debt issues.
30opportunities, loosely represented by an increased market value of the ﬁrm, should translate
into new debt issues.
Debt renegotiation, however, makes the analysis considerably more complicated than
Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001), who do not consider this issue. We are then considering a
two-sided problem with debt renegotiation on the downside and releveraging on the upside.
Importantly, the ﬁrm will not wish to increase leverage at xt >x 0 exactly to the level
that it would have chosen at entry if xt h a db e e nt h ee n t r yp o i n t . T h er e a s o ni st h a t
the function G∗(x) chosen initially commits the ﬁrm to a more patient approach to debt
renegotiation than appears optimal when looked at from xt.35 Even more, if the ﬁrm has
begun to renegotiate, it would optimally releverage if it recovers, but less aggressively so, as
parts of its bargaining chip V ∗(ys)− NG∗(ys) has already irreversibly been pledged away in
past rounds of renegotiation. Thus, the optimal releveraging policy is history dependent in
a very complex fashion.
What would be the optimal seniority level of the new debt? In our model, only two
seniority levels exist: claims secured by guaranteed liquidated rights, and unsecured claims.
No further distinction has any economic signiﬁcance, since the ﬁrm honors all coupon obliga-
tion alike before defaulting, and only guaranteed liquidation rights have value in the case of
default. Therefore, and considering that the ﬁrm has already more liquidation rights pledged
away than it wished to have at the time of the new issue, the new debt would be entirely
unsecured, and hence either be subordinated to the existing claims or have equal priority.
This outcome of our model is reminiscent of the observation that many ﬁrms tend to issue
junior claims when new growth opportunities arise.
B. Bank Debt, Large Debtholders and Mixed Debt Structures
Firms often have more complicated debt structures than in our model where there is initially
just a single class of public debt. Many ﬁrms have mixed debt structures combining con-
centrated blocks of debt, like bank debt and private placements, and dispersed or publicly
traded debt. The interaction between bank debt restructurings and the terms and success
probability of public debt exchange oﬀers is important in practice, as has been observed
notably by Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) and James (1996).36
Our model would predict that a bank would agree to a debt-for-equity swap if it is the
single important creditor of the ﬁrm, but it will be reluctant to do so if there are competing
dispersed debt claims for fear of “buoying up” the value of these claims. This seems to be
consistent with the evidence.37
35The abandonment point ys that maximizes the initial static trade-oﬀ is normally increasing in x0.
36Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) report for their sample of distressed junk bond issuers that 86
% restructure bank debt, but only 50 % attempt to reschedule their public debt. A ﬁfth of the bank debt
restructurings in their sample lead to an increase in bank collateral.
37Brown, James and Mooradian (1993) report that ﬁrms have public debt outstanding in 75 % of the cases
where banks increase the collateral level, but only in 27 % of the cases where bank accept equity positions.
31Including banks’ renegotiation strategies provides, in our view, the most promising av-
enue to incorporate debt-for-equity swaps into our model. The frequency of debt-for-equity
swaps presents a puzzle for a theoretical model like ours based on the hold-out incentives
of dispersed debtholders, as Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) note. To account for bank be-
havior could be an interesting avenue to explain this puzzle, since debt-for-equity oﬀers in
bond workouts often are imposed by banks. James (1996) ﬁnds that the larger the bank
concession, the less senior debt will be oﬀered to bondholders, presumably since exclusive
seniority is a condition for banks to make concessions.38
C. Asset Characteristics and Alternative Commitment Devices
Our analysis has assumed that the manager can choose the function G∗
0(x), within the
feasibility bounds, so as to commit to abandonment at the ex ante preferred point, ys.W e
wish to emphasize that the nature of collateralizable assets certainly puts limitations on the
ability to deﬁne this function. Collateral consists of a collection of assets whose liquidation
values is determined by their physical characteristics. In practice, we would certainly expect
that physical asset characteristics impose substantial restrictions on the shareholder’s ex
ante choice of the initial guaranteed liquidation rights, G∗
0(x). The assets with liquidation
value V ∗
0 (x) may not be malleable enough to approximate the optimal function G∗
0(x).
There exist, however, a couple of interesting contractual devices having the potential to
solve the manager’s problem, namely to commit her to not default before the second best
point ys.W ew a n tt ob r i e ﬂy discuss two rather well-known contract features, callability and
maturity, that have the potential to make the manager more patient and to increase ex ante
ﬁrm value.
(i) Callable Debt. Suppose the ﬁrm issues fully collateralized debt at x0, as a combination
of several bonds. Some bond issue have zero initial collateral, but there is also at least one
bond which carries a high aggregate collateral and which is callable: The shareholder can
call the zero bond at any time for a ﬁxed call price. This call feature is attached only to
the bonds which carry collateral. Therefore, only after calling a collateralized bond can the
shareholder use the portion of the liquidation value over which she just gained discretion
in order to renegotiate coupon concession from the holders of the non-collateralized coupon
bonds. Consequently, setting the right call prices, the shareholder can credibly commit to
James (1996) ﬁnds that concomitant bank concessions signiﬁcantly increase the concessions obtained in
exchange oﬀers of dispersed debt, and the odds for exchange oﬀers to succeed. The evidence in non-US
ﬁnancial systems is consistent with the view that banks increase their collateral as ﬁrms go into ﬁnancial
distress, as Harhoﬀ and Koerting (1998) report for Germany and Franks and Sussman (2000) for the UK.
38For example, banks might impose debt-for-equity swaps on public creditors, as a precondition for their
making of concessions, as a means to avoid institutional barriers on their own equity holdings. A debt-for-
equity swap can be engineered in such a way that it is based on a dilution threat, for example if high cash
ﬂow promises are made, which implicitly lower the liquidation value of holdouts. A debt-for-equity swap
might also be attractive to signal the poor prospects of the distressed ﬁrm, as explained by Brown, James
and Mooradian (1993).
32exercise the calls exactly at the right trigger points.
(ii) Maturity Structure. A short debt maturity represents a vehicle committing the
debtor to abstain from a premature use of the option to renegotiate. The intuition is as
follows: Under short maturity, a given fraction of the debt will have to be reﬁnanced between
the exchange oﬀer trigger point and the ﬁnal abandonment trigger level. The earlier the
exchange oﬀer trigger point, the higher this probability. Therefore, investors anticipate that
the probability for enjoying full repayment of the principal is increasing if the renegotiation
proposal is launched early rather than late. As a result, debtholders will require a more
generous exchange oﬀer in order to be willing to surrender their contracts.
The choice of average maturity determines what fraction of debt is expected to be reﬁ-
nanced between renegotiation and abandonment: If maturity is very long, none of the debt
is expected to be reﬁnanced, with the incentive consequences studied earlier. If maturity is
very short, almost all of the debt is fully and instantaneously reﬁnanced, so the debtor has
no incentive at all to propose exchange oﬀers, just as with fully collateralized debt.
IX. Conclusion
This paper presents a fully dynamic analysis of debt renegotiation with many creditors. In
this framework, it becomes clear that demands for concessions lack intertemporal consistency
if they are not backed up by additional liquidation rights which are safe from continued
expropriation. This insight provides a natural explanation for the notion that creditors
derive some protection against opportunistic default threats if debt is widely dispersed.
The repeated and dynamic nature of our analysis enables us to identify the debtor’s com-
mitment problem: to make debt renegotiation possible, the debtor must be able to commit to
liquidation rights which are guaranteed. This provides a justiﬁcation for the existence of (i)
secured liquidation rights (collateral as well as debt-seniority, depending on the intangibility
of ﬁrm assets), (ii) protective covenants limiting debt-issuance and (iii) seemingly coercive
voting practices such as exit-consent solicitations, which can all be valuable by fostering
renegotiability.
The possibility of subsequent debt renegotiation rounds severely limits the size of con-
cessions that an opportunistic debtor can obtain. This can be attractive from an ex ante
perspective: Debt dispersion protects creditors from excessive opportunistic expropriation.
As a result, the debt capacity is larger than in the single-creditor case. This paper identiﬁes
the capacity to sustain a higher level of borrowing and thus a higher debt tax shield as an
important motive behind the issue of dispersed (public) debt.
We ﬁnd that treating dispersed debt as if it was concentrated debt leads to substantial
pricing errors. Anything else would have been sheer coincidence, given that debt renegotia-
tion relies on such fundamentally diﬀerent economic mechanisms. We furthermore ﬁnd large
33diﬀerences in both the optimal capital structure policy and the debt riskiness, although the
resulting ex ante ﬁrm value is about equal.
An important insight of our model is that it cannot only explain substantial default
spreads, but that the default spread may even be larger than in the case of a single creditor.
This diﬀerence is explained both by the higher level of debt and by the fact that the optimal
abandonment decision is premature, which raises the risk for existing debt claims.
Understanding the dynamics of mixed debt structures, combining concentrated and dis-
persed debt claims as well as multiple layers of priority, presents an empirically pertinent
and theoretically intriguing agenda for future research.
34Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Assume that n1 debtholders have accepted one oﬀer, even though
the shareholder can make a second oﬀer in the future. These senior creditors are receiving
ac o u p o nδ1 since accepting the ﬁrst oﬀer, at x1. Now, the most opportunistic second oﬀer
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This contradicts the initial assumption, that n1 bondholders have accepted one oﬀer. QED.















P(xk ¤ ys) .
In regime k, i.e. for ˇ xt ∈ (xk+1,x k], debtholders who have tendered receive a coupon δk until the
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35Now, when the k + 1th exchange oﬀer is triggered at (xt)=( xk+1), the most opportunistic oﬀer















P(xk+1 ¤ ys) .
To be time consistent, the kth exchange oﬀer must guarantee that the future value of tendering
debtholders’ claim just before the k + 1th oﬀer is greater or equal to its value if the shareholder
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[1 − P(xk ¤ ys)]
P(xk ¤ ys)
. QED.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 : The proof is by backwards induction. First, we show that the tendering
constraint must be binding in the last (the Kth) exchange oﬀer. Then, we show that by induction,
the tendering constraint must also be binding in all previous exchange oﬀers. After the Kth oﬀer,

















P(xt ¤ y)( 5 1)
Expression (51) takes into account that, after the last oﬀer, any liquidation rights which are not
guaranteed to creditors previously held out, are equally distributed among the nK creditors who





in the last regime of a creditor held out in the Kth oﬀer is as stated in (7).
To simplify notation, we consider strategies where nk = K,f o ra l lk ∈ {1;...;K}, i.e. the debtor
oﬀers K new contracts in each round. This is without loss of generality.
The optimal abandonment trigger level, ys,s o l v e s



































































P(xt ¤ xK) .
36Next, we develop an argument which holds for any given sequence of guaranteed liquidation
rights changes, G∗
k(x), for k =0 ,1,...,K. This argument must then also be valid for any optimal
sequence of guaranteed liquidation rights values. Replacing in the shareholder’s problem in regime
K − 1,f o rˇ xt ∈ [xK,x K−1):
max
(δK,xK)
(1 − τ)Π(xt) − (1 − τ)Π(ys)P(xt ¤ ys) − N (1 − τ)
δK−1
ρ
[1 − P(xt ¤ xK)]
−N (1 − τ)
δK
ρ






[1 − P(xK ¤ ys)]
P(xK ¤ ys)
, (53)
xt ≥ xK ≥ ys (54)
ys =a r gm a x
½·
V ∗(y) − NG ∗







We know that the second part of the constraint (54) cannot be binding, because in regime K−1,
δK−1 < δK. We can disregard this constraint when setting up the (Kuhn-Tucker) Lagrangian of
this problem, which we write as:
max
δK,xK
L =( 1 − τ)Π(xt) − (1 − τ)Π(ys)P(xt ¤ ys) − N (1 − τ)
δK−1
ρ
[1 − P(xt ¤ xK)]
− N (1 − τ)
δK
ρ














− ν [xK − xt]
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose to the contrary that the Kth tendering constraint (53)
is not binding, i.e. µ = 0. We distinguish two cases:




L =( 1 − τ)Π(xt) − (1 − τ)Π(ys)P(xt ¤ ys) − N (1 − τ)
δK−1
ρ
[1 − P(xt ¤ xK)]
−N (1 − τ)
δK
ρ
[P(xt ¤ xK) − P(xt ¤ ys)] .
Maximizing gives the FOC:
∂L
∂xK








By construction, δK < δK−1. Hence ∂L/∂xK > 0, contradicting the assumption that µ = ν =0 .
Case B: ν 6=0 ,i . e .t h eﬁrst part of (54) is binding. We have then µ =0a n dν 6= 0 and hence
xK = xt. The (Kuhn-Tucker) Lagrangian becomes:
max
δK,xK
L =( 1 − τ)Π(xt) − (1 − τ)Π(ys)P(xt ¤ ys)
−N (1 − τ)
δK
ρ
[1 − P(xt ¤ ys)] − ν [xK − xt].





















which simpliﬁes to ∂L/∂δK = −N (1 − τ)/ρ[1 − P(xt ¤ ys)] by the envelope theorem. Hence
∂L/∂δK < 0, contradicting the assumption that µ =0 .
Thus, in Case A and in Case B there is a contradiction to the assumption that µ =0 . T h i s
concludes the proof that the Kth tendering constraint is binding.
It remains to develop the induction argument. Consider regime k<K ,w i t hac o u p o no fδk.
The proof by contradiction mirrors the one for the Kth regime. Consider Case A where µ = ν =0 .
At any state xt in the regime k,t h eﬁrst order condition of the Lagrangian yields as in Eq. (56):
∂L
∂xk+1








giving a contradiction as ∂L
∂xk+1 6= 0 is implied by δk > δk+1. Hence if µ = 0, necessarily ν 6=0 .
Consider Case B where µ =0b u tν 6=0 .A ta n ys t a t ext in the regime k,t h eﬁrst order condition





















which simpliﬁes to ∂L/∂δk = −N (1 − τ)/ρ[1 − P(xt ¤ ys)] < 0 by the envelope theorem, contra-
dicting µ =0 .QED.
Result 1 (Invariance of ex post optimal abandonment strategy) There exists a feasible strat-
egy where the shareholder will abandon exactly at ys,w h e r eys denotes the shareholders’ value max-
imizing abandonment trigger point right after entry.
Proof: Since all exchange oﬀers along an optimal exchange oﬀer strategy s will be binding by
virtue of Lemma 3, S(0)(xt) can be written as in (23). Then consider the following single exchange
oﬀer strategy s where K = 1.L e tˆ δ be a coupon such that
ys =a r g m a x
y
(















That is, if ˆ δ is the average coupon after debt’s liquidation rights are fully guaranteed (non-
renegotiable), then the shareholder will ultimately abandon exactly at the point ys.N e x t ,d e ﬁne ˆ x
as the point such that
V ∗(ys)/N − G∗
0(ys)=
(δ0 − ˆ δ)
ρ
[1 − P(ˆ x ¤ ys)]
P(ˆ x ¤ ys)
. (59)
That is, if the shareholder proposes the ﬁrst exchange oﬀer exactly at ˆ x and if the shareholder
proposes to guarantee all not initially guaranteed liquidation rights, V ∗(x)−NG ∗
0(x), in this oﬀer,
h eo b t a i n sa nc o u p o nr e d u c t i o no fN (δ0 − ˆ δ) in exchange.
38Consider then a single exchange oﬀer strategy (ˆ x, ˆ δ,n 1,D1), with a new contract of D1 =
(ˆ δ1,V∗(x) − NG∗
0(x))/n1), where ˆ δ1 = δ0 − N(δ0 − ˆ δ)/n1. This implies that the average coupon
after the exchange is ˆ δ = n1ˆ δ1 +( N − n1)δ0. First, by construction of ˆ δ in Eq. (58), this coupon
reduction is just enough to ensure that the shareholder’s ex post optimal abandonment point will
be ys. Therefore, this single exchange oﬀer strategy is optimal at any point prior to reaching ˆ x for
the ﬁrst time, since it implies that the upper bound of the equity value is reached, S(xt). Second,
this single exchange oﬀer strategy is optimal at any point after reaching ˆ x for the ﬁrst time, since
then debt’s liquidation rights are fully guaranteed and no further exchange oﬀers can succeed.
The existence proof is ﬁnished by noting that P(x ¤ ys) is strictly decreasing and continuous
in x,a n dP(x ¤ ys) → 1 as x → ˆ y. For any coupon ˆ δ ≤ δ0 and debt contract (δ0,G ∗
0(x)) such that
V ∗(ys)/N − G∗
0(ys) <
(δ0 − ˆ δ)
ρ
[1 − P(x0 ¤ ys)]
P(x0 ¤ ys)
, (60)
t h e r ew i l lb ea ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o nˆ x ∈ (ys,x 0) at which the shareholder can launch an optimal single
exchange oﬀer.
Finally, note that other optimal exchange oﬀer strategies may exist as well. Any optimal
strategy s must, in any regime k, satisfy the condition:
ˆ y ≡ argmax
y
(














N ˆ δk =
Pk





k(x) is the aggregate value of guaranteed liquidation rights in the kth regime. QED.
P r o o fo fE q u a t i o n( 2 9 ) :Consider the following deviation strategy for the manager: do not
renegotiate, and abandon at yf(δ0). This gives the following incentive constraint
S(0)(x0 | ys) ≥ S
(0)
f (x0 | yf) . (62)
Clearly, G∗
0(x) can always be designed in a way such that any other deviation strategy of the
manager is less attractive than abandoning either at yf (without renegotiating) or at ys (after
optimal renegotiation). To see this, consider a diﬀerentiable approximation of the following function
G∗
0(x): G∗
0(x)=NV∗(x)f o ra l lx>y s and G∗
0(ys)=0 .
T h e r e f o r e ,t h el o w e s te xa n t ee q u i t yv a l u et h a ti si n c e n t i v e - c o m p a t i b l ei st h ev a l u ew h e r e( 6 2 )
is just binding. QED.
P r o o fo fE q u a t i o n( 3 0 ) :Condition (29) can be written as
NG∗



























[V ∗(ys − Π(ys]P(x0 ¤ ys) . (64)
































(1 − P(x0 ¤ yf)) > 0. QED.



























































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :Expression (36) is identical to (23), and expression (35) is obtained
after substituting (33) into the expression for the debt value. Equations (31), (31), (32) and (33)
are obtained developing (26), (28), (29) and (30), respectively, using notably (2).
Finally, equation (29), S(0)(x0 | ys)=S
(0)
f (x0 | yf), implies S(0)(x | ys)=S
(0)
f (x | yf) for all
x ≥ yf,g i v e nt h a tS
(0)
f corresponds to the no-renegotiation case. But then, S(0)(x | ys)=S
(0)
f (x |
yf) for all x ≥ yf implies that no diﬀerence in the income ﬂow stream between the two cases occurs
before yf is ﬁrst reached, and consequently renegotiation only takes places after. QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :Consider the ﬁrm values when an identical coupon δ0 is issued in (i)
non-renegotiable (fully guaranteed) debt contracts and (ii) renegotiable (not fully guaranteed) debt
contract. These are respectively, for xt ≥ yf,
S
(0)
f (xt | yf)+ND
(0)
f (xt)=U(xt | yf)+τ
δ0
ρ
(1 − P(xt ¤ yf)) + τV ∗(yf)P(xt ¤ yf) , (69)
S(0)(xt | ys)+ND(0)(xt)=U(xt | ys)+τ D(0)(xt)( 7 0 )
= U(xt | yf)+τ
δ0
ρ






(1 − P(yf ¤ ys))
¸
P(xt ¤ yf)( 7 1)
= U(xt | yf)+τ
δ0
ρ





P(xt ¤ yf) . (72)
Now, from equation (29), S(0)(x | ys)=S
(0)
f (x | yf) for all x ≥ yf, hence S(0)(yf | ys)=0 .
Using (70), the debt value is then equal to the unlevered ﬁrm value D(0)(yf)=U(yf | ys)/(1 − τ).
40Therefore, the ﬁrm value at yf is S(0)(yf | ys)+ND(0)(yf)=U(yf | ys)/(1 − τ)=Π(yf)+












=( 7 3 )
³
Π(yf) − V ∗(yf)+[ V ∗(ys) − Π(ys)]P(yf ¤ ys)
´
P(xt ¤ yf), (74)
which is strictly positive under Assumption 1. QED.
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 :
Suppose the ﬁrm issues debt (δ0,G ∗
0(x)) such that G∗
0(ys)=0a si n( 3 0 )a n dt h ec o u p o nδ0 is
chosen such that the ﬁrm is 100% levered at x0, i.e.
δ0
ρ





= Π(x0)+[ V ∗(ys) − Π(ys)]P(x0 ¤ ys)( 7 5 )
By construction, S(0)(x0 | ys)=0 . N o wo u rﬁnding that there cannot be debt renegotiation
prior to yf, together with equality (29), imply that
S
(0)
f (x0 | yf)=0 ( 7 6 )
and hence yf = x0, since the equity value without renegotiation S
(0)
f (x0 | y) is strictly concave
in y (implied by Assumption 1)w i t ham a x i m u ma tyf.
Consider a single exchange oﬀe rs t r a t e g y( a si nt h ep r o o fo fR e s u l t1) with renegotiation at
x1 ≤ x0. There is zero collateral prior to renegotiation, G∗
0(ys) = 0, and full collateral, G∗
1(ys)=
V ∗(ys)/N after the single exchange oﬀer, hence δ1 < δ0, from Lemma 3. By construction of the
single exchange oﬀer strategy, ys = yf(δ1). Hence
dyf(δ1)
dδ1 > 0a n dyf(δ0)=x0 imply that ys <x 0.
But then from (75),
D(0)(x0)=Π(x0)+[ V ∗(ys) − Π(ys)]P(x0 ¤ ys) >V∗(x0) ,
proving the claim, since V ∗(x0) is the debt capacity with a single creditor.
For the debt contract considered (G∗
0(ys)=0a n dl e v e r a g eo f100%, ys <x 0)t ob ef e a s i b l e ,
it must be true that xK <x 0,w h e r exK being the point x of the last debt renegotiation round,
i.e. renegotiation is delayed. But then note that in our single exchange oﬀer strategy, x1 <x 0,
otherwise either S(0)(x0 | ys) > 0o rS
(0)
f (x0 | yf) < 0, contradicting our starting assumption or
(76). Thus, xK <x 0. QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : At the optimal capital, the ﬁrm with single-creditor debt is at its debt
capacity Λs(x0)=V ∗(x0):
Ss(x0 | ˜ y)+NDs(x0)=U(x0 | ˜ y)+τ V ∗(x0) . (77)
41First Part: Following the proof of Proposition 2,










Π(yf) − V ∗(yf)+[ V ∗(ys) − Π(ys)]P(yf ¤ ys)
´
P(x0 ¤ yf). (78)
Now S
(0)
f (xt | yf)+ND
(0)
f (xt) >U (x0 | ˜ y), since S
(0)
f (xt | yf)+ND
(0)
f (xt), the value under the
optimal capital structure with non-renegotiable debt, is larger than the value when non-renegotiable
debt is kept to the level such that yf =˜ y, which in turn is larger than U(x0 | ˜ y). Therefore
S(0)(x0 | ys)+ND(0)(x0) >U (x0 | ˜ y)+
³
Π(yf) − V ∗(yf)+[ V ∗(ys) − Π(ys)]P(yf ¤ ys)
´
P(x0 ¤ yf). (79)





Π(yf) − V ∗(yf)+[ V ∗(ys) − Π(ys)]P(yf ¤ ys)
´
P(x0 ¤ yf)( 8 0 )
⇒ S(0)(x0 | ys)+ND(0)(x0) ≥ Ss(x0 | ˜ y)+NDs(x0) . (81)
Second Part: At the optimal capital with widely held renegotiable debt contracts
S(0)(x0 | ys)+ND(0)(x0)=U(x0 | ys)+τ N
δ0
ρ




1 − P(x0 ¤ ys)
1 − P(yf(δ0) ¤ ys)
¶ h
Π(yf(δ0)) + (V ∗(ys) − Π(ys)))P(yf(δ0) ¤ ys)
i
. (83)
Therefore, given that U(x0 | ˜ y) >U(x0 | ys), equations (76), (82) and (83) yield:
V ∗(x0) >
µ
1 − P(x0 ¤ ys)





⇒ S(0)(x0 | ys)+ND(0)(x0) <S s(x0 | ˜ y)+NDs(x0) . QED.
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mTable 1: Closed-Form Asset Pricing Formulas in the GBM-Linear Structure.
The table gives the expression of the constants (aA,b A,c A)s u c ht h a tA(xt)=aA + bA xt + cA xλ
t
and the relevant decision trigger levels.
A(xt)
U(xt | y) aA: (1 − τ)Θ0
bA: (1 − τ)Θ1
cA: (1 − τ)[ Θ∗
0 − Θ0 +( Θ∗
1 − Θ1)y]y−λ
˜ y [−λ/(1 − λ)] [(Θ∗




f (xt) aA: (1 − τ)[ Θ0 − Nδ0/ρ]
bA: (1 − τ)Θ1












yf [−λ/(1 − λ)] [(Nδ0/ρ − Θ0)/Θ1]
S(0)(xt) aA: (1 − τ)[ Θ0 − Nδ0/ρ]
bA: (1 − τ)Θ1
cA: (1 − τ)[ Θ∗









s (xt) aA: (1 − τ)[ Θ0 − Nδ0/ρ]
bA: (1 − τ)Θ1
cA: (1 − τ)[ −Θ∗
0 − Θ∗
1xs + Nδ0/ρ +
{Θ∗
0 − Θ0 +( Θ∗











xs [−λ/(1 − λ)] [(Nδ0/ρ − Θ∗
0)/Θ∗
1]Table 2: Type of Debt and Optimal Contract.
For each types of debt, the table exhibits the (a) optimal debt contract and (b) optimal capital
structure at entry, and the resulting (c) ﬁrm value, (d) credit spreads, (e) risk premium, (f) ﬁrst
renegotiation trigger levels and (g) liquidation trigger levels. Input parameters are µ =0 .03,
σ =0 .30, θ1 = 1, θ∗
1 =0 .1, θ0 = −4, θ∗
0 =4 ,ρ =0 .06, N = 10a n dτ =0 .13.
(a) Optimal Debt Contract Issued at x0 = 30: Value
Dispersed Creditors + Optimal Guaranteeing d Coupon δ0 0.1803
b Slope dG ∗
0(ys)/dys 0.2017
Non-Renegotiable Debt (Fully Guaranteed) Coupon δ0,f 0.0680
Single Creditor Coupon δ0,s 0.0600
(b) Optimal Leverage at x0 =3 0 : Value
Dispersed Creditors + Optimal Guaranteeing l(0)(x0) ≡ ND(0)(x0)/V (0)(x0) 80.42 %
Non-Renegotiable Debt (Fully Guaranteed) l
(0)




f (x0) 40.04 %
Single Creditor ls(x0) ≡ NDs(x0)/Vs(x0) 29.11 %
Relative diﬀerence l
(0)
f (x0)/l(0)(x0) − 1 -50.20 %
Relative diﬀerence ls(x0)/l(0)(x0) − 1 -63.80 %
(c) Firm Value at x0 =3 0 : Value
Dispersed Creditors + Optimal Guaranteeing V (0)(x0) ≡ S(0)(x0)+ND(0)(x0) 24.95
Non-Renegotiable Debt (Fully Guaranteed) V
(0)





Single Creditor Vs(x0) ≡ Ss(x0)+NDs(x0) 24.05
Relative diﬀerence V
(0)
f (x0)/V (0)(x0) − 1 -3.32 %
Relative diﬀerence Vs(x0)/V (0)(x0) − 1 -3.62 %
(d) Credit Spreads at x0 =3 0 : Value (bps)
Dispersed Creditors + Optimal Guaranteeing s(x0) ≡ δ0/D(0)(x0) − ρ 298.54
Non-Renegotiable Debt (Fully Guaranteed) sf(x0) ≡ δ0,f/D
(0)
f (x0) − ρ 104.38
Single Creditor ss(x0) ≡ δ0,s/Ds(x0) − ρ 257.14
Relative diﬀerence sf(x0)/s(0)(x0) − 1 -65.04 %
Relative diﬀerence ss(x0)/s(0)(x0) − 1 -13.87 %
(e) Risk Premium at x0 =3 0 : Value/δ
Dispersed Creditors + Optimal Guaranteeing p(x0) ≡ δ0 − ρD(0)(x0) 33.22 %
Non-Renegotiable Debt (Fully Guaranteed) pf(x0) ≡ δ0,f − ρD
(0)
f (x0) 14.82 %
Single Creditor ps(x0) ≡ δ0,s − ρDs(x0) 30.00 %
Relative diﬀerence pf(x0)/p(0)(x0) − 1 -55.39 %
Relative diﬀerence ps(x0)/p(0)(x0) − 1 -9.71 %
(f) First Renegotiation trigger levels: Value
Dispersed Creditors + Optimal Guaranteeing yf(δ0) 17.02
Non-Renegotiable Debt (Fully Guaranteed) n.a.
Single Creditor xs 30.00
(g) Liquidation trigger levels: Value
Dispersed Creditors + Optimal Guaranteeing ys 9.97
Non-Renegotiable Debt (Fully Guaranteed) yf 7.66
Single Creditor (same as Unlevered Firm) ˜ y 4.44